

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

climate, this session can give an impetus to setting in motion the disarmament process. Nor should we underestimate the important part which the Committee on Disarmament can play in ensuring that the opportunity of the second special session is not missed. My delegation therefore agrees with those speakers who have suggested that our work during the next 12 weeks must be aimed principally at ensuring that the Committee makes an optimum contribution to the success of the special session.

The conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty would undoubtedly contribute immensely to the success of the second special session. But hopes of this happening have dimmed. It should be possible at the very least for the Committee to establish a working group on the CTB at the current session and to make some progress towards the treaty which can be reported to the special session. There is, of course, a direct link between nuclear disarmament and a test ban treaty. But it was our impression that the test ban was an immediate rather than long-range objective of all Governments of nuclear and non-nuclear States. We would do well to ponder, at this stage, the risks which any further delay in concluding a test ban treaty would entail. It would also be relevant to recall once again the link between measures to halt the vertical as well as the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Another issue on which this Committee has been asked to conclude an agreement for submission to the second special session is negative security assurances. My delegation was most gratified at the overwhelming support for Pakistan's resolution on this subject at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly. In accordance with the recommendation made in that General Assembly resolution, my delegation is prepared to undertake further intensive efforts to search for a common approach or a common formula "including in particular those considered during the session of the Committee on Disarmament held in 1981". May I recall that these include principally the one proposed by the Netherlands and the three formulations informally suggested by my delegation. The discussions last year, however, have made it amply clear that an agreement would become possible only if the nuclear-weapon States reconsider their divergent positions and respond in a more forthright and credible way to the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The General Assembly has appealed, "especially to the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character". I can do no better than to reiterate this appeal. As Ambassador Fein put it, "the ball is in the court of the nuclear-weapon States". We look forward to a serious and considered response from them, not merely a reiteration of positions which are conceived only in the context of their narrow self-interest and nuclear doctrines.

My delegation would welcome the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We hope that it will be given a new mandate which will enable it to commence the concrete task of negotiating the text of a chemical weapons convention. This goal has become all the more urgent in the light of persistent reports about the use of chemical weapons in some parts of the world and other reports regarding decisions taken to augment and modernize chemical weapons stockpiles. Further delay or ambiguity regarding the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention could well erode the existing international consensus on the subject and add the spectre of general chemical warfare to the nuclear shadow which already hangs over mankind.