

Thailand were the latter to be gravely threatened. An independent Canadian policy could equally well reaffirm its unalterable opposition to the continued presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea, while nonetheless resuming a variety of activities with Vietnam, under certain conditions.

Having made its position clear Canada could:

- authorize funding to certain Canadian non-governmental organizations concerned with humanitarian relief and encourage them to gradually resume their activities in Vietnam, and even some activities in Kampuchea, without implying recognition of the regime in Phnom Penh;
- encourage and facilitate exploratory steps on the part of Canadian firms which would like to make contact with Vietnam, lest they be deprived of potential markets if the political situation changes in the not too distant future;
- encourage the resumption of educational and cultural contacts by cooperating with those Canadian provinces interested in arranging exchange programmes with Indochina;
- cooperate with Indonesia, one of Canada's most important allies in ASEAN, to discover Vietnamese intentions and pass on to Hanoi the significance and extent of any changes in Canadian policy;
- make it clear that Canada supports Prince Sihanouk's current efforts to find an acceptable solution to the problem in Cambodia by initiating a dialogue among the various Khmer factions; and indicate that Canada is willing to join other countries in guaranteeing a "genuine" neutrality for Cambodia once the Vietnamese troops have left;
- make it known that Canada would be willing to help supervise general elections in Kampuchea either under UN or other auspices;