

Table 8 read in conjunction with Table 7 seeks to illustrate this general observation with reference to Space Command. In sum, "NORAD" as it is now understood by Canadians is a very small adjunct to Space Command. All NORAD generated information will feed into Space Command; how much non-NORAD generated information will feed back to Canadian authorities is a moot point. In this respect, there is, of course, an oddity in the creation of Unified Space Command. The United States has subsumed NORAD — a command created by international agreement, though admittedly not by treaty — under a unified national command system. Although somewhat obscured by the fact that the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD (CINCNORAD) became Commander-in-Chief of Unified Space Command, the logic of the organization chart is that the NORAD commander reports to Unified Space Command and to the Canadian Government. The reorganization involved in creating Unified Space Command was more palatable to Canada precisely because General Herres wore 'three hats', but there is no logical requirement for this to be so, and in the future it is not inconceivable that CINCNORAD or his Canadian deputy will report to a CINC Unified Space Command who is not only a different but also a more senior officer.²⁴ Clearly, there are anomalies in this arrangement which can only be explained by assuming that the Canadian deputy CINCNORAD will have access to some but not all data available to CINC Unified Space Command.

As can be seen from Table 7, however, the organizational change only reflects the basic realities of resources applied to continental defence. Although the question of how much information is shared cannot be answered clearly, it is obviously affected by the following factors:

- (i) ownership, where it may be assumed that sole US ownership will predispose stricter controls on sharing;
- (ii) location, where it may be assumed that if assets are deployed on Canadian territory there is a greater likelihood of shared information;
- (iii) operation, where it may be assumed that non-NORAD operated assets will also restrict information exchange, and
- (iv) sensitivity, in that information may be considered too sensitive to pass on to Canadians. For example, information that gave access to US and Soviet strategic plans would doubtless transcend any perceived Canadian "need-to-know", and communication which revealed the location and operational practices of SSBNs and SSNs might also be considered beyond the authority of NORAD.

²⁴ At the beginning of October 1986 General Herres relinquished his position as CINC Air Force Space Command "to concentrate entirely on his 'warfighting' jobs as CINCSpace and CINCNORAD". (*Military Space*, 29 September 1986.) For an explanation of the relationship between the various commands, see Herres' testimony in *Minutes, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence*, Issue number 54, 11 December 1985.