

ercise a moral judgment in any accepted sense. The brute creation do this down to a very low scale of being, without having a moral nature properly so-called. Unless there is a violent wrenching of the term from its universal interpretation, this term must mean the capacity we have to exercise intellectual judgments on ethical subjects. There can be no moral nature without intellect in a normal condition. Society does not hold the idiot, the lunatic, or the brute capable of exercising moral judgments, and hence responsible, just because of the dethronement of the intellect, or because of its existence on a low scale. Passion, desire and emotion necessarily need no such judgments to allow their exercise, but without intellect there can be no moral nature. It is well, however, to keep in mind what the author means when he uses this term, and only hold him to his own definition, even when he uses it in this unusual way.

The same might be said of the expression, "Lines of Cleavage," when applied to the relationship of man to his surroundings. This term is scarcely applicable because of the necessary intimacy and interdependence of a living being including its immediate apposition to the nearest existences. There is no analogy between that and the cleavage of crystalization, or of the fibres of muscles.

So also on page 6, we are told that memory is a registering function of the intellect, (so says Maudsley.) Now, there is no proof that memory is a function in any sense, and if it were, it cannot register for the simple reason that registration must have taken place before a remembrance can have an existence. If there is nothing received, there can be nothing to remember. So the reception (or registration) of mental or physical impressions must, necessarily, antedate memory.

On page 7 it is said, "we know, and can know, nothing about force, and nothing about qualities." We presume it is meant that we do not know them absolutely as distinct and separate entities, because it is equally true that in this sense we know of nothing in the universe. All that we are immediately cognizant of in the wide world is *consciousness*. Relatively the statement is not physiologically

correct, as doubtless the author will know the first time a lunatic knocks him down. Force will then become an experience of consciousness, and it will also be a *striking* illustration of the chronological order in which the registration of an event, and the memory of it stand to one another.

On page 4 it is written that "certain forces, such as motion, heat and light, are correlative with man's receptive faculties." If this sentence means anything it must be that these faculties can conversely be changed into motion, heat and light. It is difficult to see how a faculty, function or act of anything can be changed in the way indicated. There is no proof given of this unknown conversion of a faculty.

The author also has the gravest doubts as to the existence of the *statical* or material part of man, at least he says we have no knowledge of its existence. This is a deplorable condition for humanity to be in, and it is a matter for regret that we are not informed whether our ignorance of it is absolute, and thus beyond inferential hypothesis of its existence or not.

On page 3 we are told that "man reacts upon and towards the external universe in three ways: namely, by his active nature, by his intellectual nature, and by his moral nature. It is natural to ask how it happens that we know of the external universe (meaning the whole system of created things) and its relations, seeing there are "the gravest doubts" as to its existence? A *nothing* can have no relations. Take this for granted, however, these divisions are scarcely apprehended because the first includes the other two. No one will deny that volition is active, and our moral judgments are no less so. We would have no evidence of their existence were it otherwise. We do not speak of right and wrong, and moral judgments in a theological sense, but we define them in the sense which Herbert Spencer has recently done in his "Data of Ethics" as the greater or less efficiency of the adjustment of acts to ends; in other words, it means the whole of human conduct in relation to itself and its surroundings. It is possible that either our stupidity or mental incapacity may have a good deal to do with