

would at once compel a conflict and leave those fools to reason over the justice of the act.

Louis Napoleon did nothing more in precipitating the late conflict. Prussia had steadily refused to disarm, her attitude compelled a corresponding movement on the part of France, and the strain on its resources could no longer be borne. The peace-at-any-price ministry, with Gladstone and Bright at its head, eagerly seized on the pretext that France had been the aggressor, to keep out of the quarrel, they had obtained power by falsehood and on a false pretext, and in order to keep it had disarmed England and left her naked in the face of the enemies of peace in Europe. As a consequence it became a matter of absolute necessity to put the whole question on false issues, and the astute Prussian Chancellor aided that movement by the exhibition of the secret treaty at the right time. The people of England have therefore to thank Gladstone, Bright, and the Manchester school for immediate loss, and the greatest prospective danger Great Britain ever encountered since she occupied a position amongst the nations of the earth. The magnitude of that danger, its near and remote bearings on our own condition, renders it necessary for the people of Canada to seriously consider the situation, and our present want of power to interfere actively in a movement involving such fearfully momentous issues because we are not represented in the Imperial Parliament supplies an irresistible argument for the revision of Imperial polity pointed out in our last two issues. English statesmanship demonstrates every day more fully the incapacity of English politicians to deal with the great questions affecting the immense dependencies of the British Crown, and as it would not tend to the peace and progress of the world to create a crowd of half-fledged nationalities, whose pretensions would re-enact the scenes of the South American Republics; it follows that the only other alternative will be to create an Imperial Parliament, in which the Colonies should be fairly represented.

When the Reciprocity Treaty was abrogated a howl was raised by certain Canadian journals, notably the *Trade Review*, and some of its Montreal contemporaries about the manifold miseries that were to fall on Canada in consequence of the Yankees shutting us out of their very profitable markets. A good many Canadians, however, understood this trade question far better than either the Yankee protectionists or their Montreal friends, and stoutly maintained that while it was in general a very good thing to have reciprocal trade relations, and it would not be desirable to disturb the treaty, if parties were satisfied; yet on the whole this country would be by far a greater gainer by its abrogation, inasmuch as the then existing treaty had given the people of the United States uncontrolled command

of the carrying trade of Canada, the fisheries and navigation of our internal waters, for which we received no equivalent whatever. Five years have elapsed since the treaty was ended by the United States, and instead of being exporters of the products of that country we have become importers. Instead of being able to shut us out of their markets by high tariffs that very operation has given us complete control thereof, and the opening of the Intercolonial Railway will render us independent of their boading system and transit. In fact it has enabled us to throw down all barriers to commerce, and to challenge them to a contest for the supremacy in their own markets and of the world, in which we are sure to win.

If fairly considered we do not want any reciprocity treaty, as no interest directly languishes for it, and it would afford us no new impetus towards developing our resources; our commercial interests are in the direction of closer trade relations with Great Britain, the West Indian and Australian Colonies, and there is no need to make Yankee monopolists our factors in dealing with the dependencies of Great Britain, South America, or other foreign countries. In order to show clearly how the exclusion of the people of the United States from the former privileges they enjoyed in our fisheries, affects directly our interests, and to illustrate the principles laid down we give the following extract from the Ottawa correspondent of the *New York World*:

"While the entire exportation from the Dominion of Canada of the produce of the fisheries to foreign countries from 1866 to 1870, both inclusive, exhibits an increase of only eleven per cent., our exports of cured fish to the United States during the same period have increased 33 1/2 per cent. Whether producer or consumer pays the heavy imposts placed on British catch, in order that competition with American catch may be so crippled as to secure your own fishermen the full control of the United States market is a question which, in this instance at least, is clearly answered by the facts. Take the case of mackerel, by way of illustration. The average prices at the commencement of reciprocity, ruled, in Halifax, from \$10 to \$12 per barrel, and in Boston from \$14 to \$16. Last year the prices ranged from \$18 to \$20 in Halifax, and from \$23 to \$27 in Boston. There was no scarcity of mackerel in Halifax, because Nova Scotia fishermen actually took 38,679 barrels more in 1870 than in the previous year, in consequence of foreigners having been kept off our inshore fishing places. The Canadian article being mostly class No. 1, a maximum rate might be taken, but I state general averages as between gross and net values of various brands. Canadian producers very nearly doubled their former receipts, besides sending you last year an unusual quantity of mackerel. Judge for yourself who really paid the duties to your government, producer or consumer. The difference between Nova Scotia and Massachusetts prices cannot be altogether owing to the relations of demand and supply, but seems chiefly due to the enhanced cost to the original purchaser and his profits, with duties added thereon, all of which somebody pays. Is it not the fish-eater?"

The correspondent goes on to show that if the Yankees are to fish at all with any success it must be within the three mile limit, and to prove that the duty laid on Canadian fish is of no consequence, as the article must be had at any price, for which he gives the following conclusive reasons:

"Your duties never touch the cost to us of either the production or the disposal. If these duties were repealed to-morrow, the ensuing freedom of commercial intercourse would undoubtedly be a great convenience to us, and might cheapen fish to your population. It would not, however, be any substantive gain to Canadians. Doubtless you would trade more readily, and, perhaps, buy more; but if your own fishermen were prosperous at the same time, our prices and yours would correspondingly decline. It is mere mockery, therefore, to discuss the removal of duties from our fish as an equivalent for admission to our exclusive and lucrative privileges. We command the sources of supply. If your fishermen could participate in them freely, the catch of Canadian fishermen might be neither as certain, as abundant, nor as saleable. The advantage to the producers would be mostly yours. Yet consumers in both countries would obtain fish all the cheaper for the busy competition of domestic industry and foreign enterprise. In your country they would be spared the extra cost of fictitious aid to American fishermen, although deprived of the luxury of discriminating against Canadians."

"High duties on provincial caught fish of any kind are of very slight consequence to us. The only fish we send to our market in appreciable quantities are just those kinds and qualities which your people must have at any price, and that our waters alone can furnish. The best markets for the bulk of Canadian cured fish are in Southern Europe, Great Britain, the British and foreign West Indies, Brazil, &c., &c. These are now our established marts, Prime mackerel, salmon, certain grades of codfish, some halibut and herrings you are obliged to procure from Canada. We are content to trade these with you at reasonable figures. Sometimes your fishermen manage to filch from our waters the best mackerel, choice codfish, herrings, and halibut. Sometimes, too, they obtain their cargoes in barter for salt and other stores. They manage by such means to make up their fares pretty cheaply. The salt they have probably withdrawn from your warehouses subject to a drawback of duty. Last year this allowance amounted to the handsome sum of \$123,474 54. Towns in Massachusetts figure for \$79,124 48 of this amount. The always complaining town of Gloucester absorbs the greatest proportion."

Every word is a proof that Canadians should pause and weigh well the consequences of allowing a foreign power the privileges of a trade capable of such development and exercising such a tremendous influence on our naval and commercial affairs. It furnishes abundant reasons why any treaty admitting Yankee fishermen to our waters should be looked on with suspicion, carefully considered and nothing conceded without full and substantial equivalents, which the United States have not to give. The conclusion is particularly rich, as it shows beyond contradiction the ground of the Yankee fisherman's complaint, and the dishonesty of President Grant's allegations in his last famous message.