

raise the men that you want. The question, therefore, is how you are to form an army of reserve which, if war should become imminent, you might combine with the Regular Army. There are wars of two descriptions in which England may be engaged. She may be engaged in a war with a Power from which there is little or no chance of invasion. Such were the wars within my recollection—the war in the Crimea, the Indian Mutiny, and others in which you have been obliged to employ your Regular Army abroad, and for which you had the greatest difficulty in raising men. Everybody recollects what took place in the Crimean war, when you had to appeal to the Militia, and to raise recruits by means of an extraordinary bounty, and what was the result? Why, the men you raised were hardly worth sending out. (Hear, hear.) Now, we want a reserve of two kinds—a first and second reserve. We want men who would be ready at a moment's warning to fill up the ranks of your Regular regiments, which I propose to reduce when at home to about 600 men each, but which in war you could at once fill up to 1,000—the officers being retained to the full amount. In the first reserve the condition of service would be that the men should serve abroad; the men of the second reserve would not be called upon to leave the country. Now, how are we to raise this army of reserve? You relied for its formation for the last six years on men who had served their time. That system was pronounced by the Royal Commission to be a perfect failure, and the Royal Commission never came to a more correct conclusion: (Hear, hear.) The first thing I did upon receiving the report of that Commission was to suspend any further proceedings in that way. Then it has been suggested to make it a condition of enlistment that men should serve so many years in the Regular Army, and so many in the army of reserve; but I don't think that would answer, for this reason, that when a man, having served in the Line, came then to serve in the reserve, he would not be able to live unless he had some employment, or you gave him high pay, and when you wanted him perhaps you would not know where to find him. I think, therefore, that instead of making the time to be spent in the reserve a portion of the original service, it should be made a substitution for a portion of that service. The way I would deal with it is this: When a regiment had completed its period of foreign service and returned home I would propose that it should not be sent into camps or garrisons, but that it should go into some locality with which it had or might wish to form some connexion, and where little or no duties would have to be performed the first year. The regiment being about to be reduced to 600, I would give the men long furloughs, and if at the end of their leave they came and said that they could find employment, I would commute the rest of their service. Now, this should be treated not as a matter of right, but of favor, because if it was a matter of right some regiments might be completely broken up. Then I would propose that the reserve should be attached to the Militia. I should be very sorry to see another army raised up between the Militia and the Line—(hear, hear)—and I think Militia officers have the strongest feeling upon this subject. (Hear, hear.) I would therefore propose that any of these men who could find employment after having completed two-thirds of their first engagement should be allowed to commute the rest of their service in the army of reserve, at the rate of two years for one, and that they should be liable to general service in case of war, and war only. The Royal Commission

had said that for the future wars would probably be of very short duration—perhaps confined to one campaign. When the war was over, therefore, I would allow these men to return to the reserve. I would have these men enrolled as regular Militiamen, subject to no other duty except that of being called upon to serve if war became imminent. When they had served two-thirds of the second period, I would attach them to the ranks of the second reserve, or those who would serve two years for one for their pensions—that is to say, who, at the expiration of six years, would become entitled to a pension. At present the regiments who are coming home are 2,165 in excess of their strength, if you reduce them, as I propose, to 600. You will have to discharge that number of men, and the whole of them would be entitled to the boon I have described. But, after all, that would give only a very small force; however, it would gradually increase. As each regiment came home the average excess of its numbers would be about 150, and so many might be permitted to commute the rest of their service by service in the reserve. Hon. gentlemen are aware that a good many officers in the Militia do not like to have old soldiers saddled upon them, but I think those serviceable men would be of great use. At all events, officers commanding the Militia need not call on them unless they wished, for these old soldiers would not require 28 days' drill, but there they would be any time we wanted to lay our hands on them. This, as I have said, will give you but a very small army of reserve, but I would propose to invite the officers of Militia regiments to call upon, say one-fourth of their establishments. The Royal Commission recommended that the Militia should be raised to their full strength, the quota being 120,000. The present strength of the Militia is about 90,000, and the difference between that and 120,000 would constitute the army of reserve. I would invite the officers of Militia regiments to ask their men to volunteer for this purpose, but I propose to make no alteration in their term of service in the Militia, or to take them away from their regiments except in the event of war, in which case they would be called to serve with the regular army. As an inducement for them thus to volunteer in the army of reserve, I would double the ordinary militia bounty—that is to say, the Militiaman who now gets £6 spread over five years would get £12 spread over five years. I have not the slightest doubt that such a bounty would induce any number of men you want to enlist, and that when men saw they received double bounty for exactly the same duties, there would be a great desire to enlist in this army of reserve. Moreover, every regiment that contributed a certain quota to the army of reserve I would allow to be raised to its full strength, so that you would have the Militia regiments exactly in the same state as before, and would have the additional men belonging to the army of reserve. Those men would be liable for service in the regular army only during the duration of war, and I believe there are thousands of Militiamen who, while they would object to joining the regular force, would have no objection to come forward for a single campaign. These men would have the ordinary Militia pay, so that the only additional expense would be the extra bounty. But I may be asked how I propose to fill up the regiments of the line. Well, I propose to induce them to enlist by an addition of 2d. a day to the pay, and I believe we could thus at once raise the number to any quantity we required. My proposal, however, is to limit the army of reserve

to one-fourth of the present establishment, and for this reason—I do not want to break up the Militia regiments. When on former occasions such regiments have volunteered for service abroad in time of war, they have been almost broken up by allowing men, almost indiscriminately, to enlist in the line. I propose, therefore, to restrict the number. I would not take a man from the Militia for the first reserve until he had gone through his drill, and was able at any time to give efficient service. Then I propose that every hundred men drawn from the Militia for the reserve should be accompanied by an officer, who should get a commission in the regular army. I am aware that this is an experiment dependent upon the voluntary action of others; but I recommend it because I do not wish to have recourse to the ballot for the Militia, or to any other means than that voluntary enlistment which has supplied our service for so many years. (Hear, hear.) The Royal Commission conclude their report with an admission that their suggestions will lead to increased expense, and they add that, considering the vast interests at stake, and the immense amount of wealth and property accumulated in the country, as well as in our large cities, they cannot believe that the nation will hesitate to pay what, after all, will but amount to a very trifling rate of insurance. I, too, am certain that the nation will not grudge that expense, and that if, this being the only country in the world where the people are free from military service, we can raise all the force we want on the moderate terms I have mentioned, we may think ourselves well off. (Hear, hear.) With regard to the second army of reserve, I do not propose to exceed the number of pensioners which there is already power to raise by Act of Parliament. There is at present power to raise 30,000, and there are now only 14,000. I should strongly deprecate making the army of reserve unconnected with the militia, because the effect would be that a man, on obtaining his discharge from the Militia, would instantly go to this army of reserve, instead of remaining in the Militia, which the double bounty I propose would induce him to do. What I propose will carry out, not, indeed, any direct recommendation of the Royal Commission, but almost all the suggestions they have offered with regard to the army of reserve. They recommend that the Secretary for War should have power to commute for service in the army of reserve, and that an addition should be made to the pensioners, both which I propose to carry out. They recommended, too, the Militia as the source to which we must look for an army of reserve. (Hear, hear.) Before coming to this conclusion, I wrote to His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, to ask for his opinion, and the recommendations of His Royal Highness were almost identical with what I have proposed. The effect will substantially be this—you will have a Militia consisting of 120,000 men, of which one-third or one-fourth will be an army of reserve, liable in time of war to fill up the ranks of the army, and the only additional expense will be the extra bounty they will receive. You will have time before coming to a vote to reflect on the subject, and to consider the propositions I have submitted are advisable to adopt or not. All I can say is, that should the recommendation I have now made of an addition to the pay of the soldiers be carried out by the House, it will be the greatest pleasure to me to think that the last act of my official life will be one which, will, I trust and believe, be for the benefit of the soldier and for the advantage of my country. (Cheers.)