cial standing. * * * Why should this species of huckstering among the profession be longer tolerated? Why should not the attorneys meet in every town in Kentucky, and, by unanimous consent, resign their membership in such bodies? The present system is the outgrowth of a morbid desire to advertise—a modern sentiment that found no place in the honest and primitive, though solid and learned, days of the profession."

A judge in the West, it appears, has created amusement for some wise people, by pronouncing *route* like "root," instead of "rowt."

The will of the Hon. Arthur Annesley, formerly a captain of the Grenadier Guards, which was proved July 28, was in these words: "All that I possess in the world I leave to my wife."

A lawyer of Portland, Maine, has sued a man for 27 cents which he had lent to him. This Portland Crœsus has probably learned ere this that financial loans had better be left to the Barings and Rothschilds of the world.

At a meeting of the members of the Bar, the Hon. R. Laflamme, Q.C., and the Batonnier, Mr. W. W. Robertson, were named delegates to the General Council, and the following gentlemen appointed examiners: S. Bethune, Q.C.; S. Pagnuelo, Q.C.; N. W. Trenholme and C. C. De Lorimier.

The new court house has so far advanced towards completion that the courts will now be held there. On Monday next the judges of the Superior and Circuit Courts will resume business upon the calendars. Much, however, remains to be done to fully fit the different rooms for court purposes.—*Chicago Legal News.*

Judge Black has long worn a black wig. Having lately donned a new one, which looks still darker, and meeting Senator Bayard, of Delaware, the latter accosted him with, "Why, Black, how young you look; you are not as gray as I am, and you must be twenty years older." "Humph," said the judge, "good reason; your *hair* comes by descent, and I got mine by purchase."

The *Southern Law Review* for August-September contains the following leading articles:—Rights of parties who acquire an interest in lands subject to a lien, by Orlando F. Bump; Power of the State and National Governments to regulate and control railroads, by David Wagner; American Law Schools, past and future, by W. G. Hammond; Stock, its nature and transfer, by Henry Budd, Jr.

The Supreme Court of California, in a recent case, *Fratt* v. *Whittier*, rendered a decision upon the much-mooted question of fixtures, holding that chandeliers were permanent parts of a building. The decision seems to have been based upon the intention of the parties, as gathered from the written and oral testimony. The decision of the court in this case seems to be at variance with that of the New York Court of Appeals, in *McKeage* v. *Hanover Fire Ins. Co.*, where chandeliers attached to gas pipes running through the house were held not to be fixtures so as to pass with the realty.

Speaking of the justices of the peace whose names were stricken from the rolls for corrupt practices, the London *Law Times* says:—The Government have resolved not to publish the names of the justices of the peace who have been struck off the roll of magistrates by the Lord Chancellor for corrupt practices. The reason assigned for the non publication is that there would be considerable difficulty in distinguishing the merits of cases to which the same measure of punishment has been meted. The total number of magistrates struck off the roll is twenty-five, and two cases are still under consideration.

A. was prosecuted for bigamy. He pleaded, first, that his first marriage had no legal existence, because his intended wife had deceived him, being *enceinte* by another man, and because he was a minor, and did not obtain his father's consent to the marriage. The court held these things might have made the first marriage voidable, but not void. A. further pleaded the statute of limitations. The Court of Cassation decided that in bigamy the statute did not begin to run till one of the marriages was dissolved; "for while the double bond of matrimony exists, the illegality continues, which makes the essence of said crime."—*Vienna Juristische Blœtter.*

Samedi dernier (Sept. 24) il y a eu réunion du conseil général du barreau de la province de Québec, sous la présidence de W. W. Robertson, batonnier général. Etaient présents l'hon. W. G. Malhiot et William White, batonniers; l'hon. George Irvine, l'hon. R. Laflamme, E. T. Brooks et C. J. B. L. Hould, délégués; et C. T. Suzor, sec.-trésorier. Le conseil était au complet à l'exception de M. Joseph G. Bossé, batonnier du district de Québec, dont le père, M. le juge Bossé, vient de mourir à Québec. Un comité spécial composé de MM. Laflamme, White, Hould, Suzor et Payment a été nommé pour élaborer des réglements. La question de nommer des sous-examinateurs d'après la section 34 de la charte a été prise en considération et approuvée. Mais avant de faire ces nominations on a cru préférable de consulter les quatre examinateurs de chaque district et de leur demander de suggérer les réglements qu'ils jugeront convenables pour définir les devoirs de ces sous-examinateurs. Il y aura une nouvelle réunion du conseil général dans le mois de Novembre. Le comité des règlements fera alors son rapport.

At the assizes, on Friday, the 5th August, at Norwich, before Mr. Justice Denman, a well-known inhabitant of that city, being called as a juror, and directed to take the New Testament to be sworn, said he thought he had better affirm; on which the learned judge, referring to the statute, asked him if he objected to be sworn; to which he answered, "Certainly not." The learned judge then said, "Then you can be sworn." The juror said, "My position is this, that I have no religious belief, and that the oath would have no effect on my verdict." The learned judge then read the terms of the statute, 21 & 25 Vict. c. 16, in which the form provided is: "I do solemnly, sincerely and truly affirm and declare that the taking of an oath is, according to my religious belief, unlawful," and then inquired of the juror if that would be true of him. To which he again answered that he had no religious belief. The learned judge then said that in his opinion the juror could neither be sworn nor affirm, and directed him to stand aside, which he accordingly did, and another juror was sworn and served in his place.—*Law Journal (London).*