

more salient and distinctive characteristics of the personnel of the United States navy. Apart from its intrinsic interest, our correspondent's appreciation is specially opportune at this moment, when the American fleet, having completed its long voyage around the Horn and across the Pacific, with a regularity and success which have impressed the world and gratified all friends of the United States, is receiving a hearty British welcome in Australasian waters. Perhaps this great circumnavigation, as yet only half completed—for the fleet will have encircled the globe and four times crossed the equator before it returns, to the Atlantic seaboard of North America—is the best testimony to the efficiency of the officers and men of the American navy. But our correspondent enables us to understand how this efficiency has been attained. It is a long story, beginning in the days of Paul Jones—a man whom this country, though it bred him, has never fairly appreciated—and coming down through four famous wars, illustrated by many a famous name, to those of the men who have made, and are making, the American navy what its recent achievement shows it to be today. Good wine needs no bush. Tried by the test of peace preparations for war—the only test to which, happily for the United States and the world, it has been subjected, since the Cuban war enlightened the whole American people as to the true conditions of sea power—the new American navy has shown itself to be in all respects worthy of the inspiring traditions of Paul Jones and Farragut. It was Paul Jones who laid down what a naval officer ought to be, in words that are still regarded as the charter of Annapolis, and were held by Washington to manifest a "strong and profound sense of the political and military weight of command on the sea." It was Farragut who carried on the great tradition, derived from Paul Jones himself, of what our Correspondent well calls "the eternal aggressive," and embodied it in the pithy maxim, "the more you hurt the enemy, the less likely he is to hurt you."

There are traditions not less dear to our own Navy than to that of the United States. They spring, in fact, from a common source; for, although, as our Correspondent says, the United States navy is radically different from any other in the character of both commissioned and enlisted personnel, yet it is not less true, as he acknowledges, that its customs are founded on British customs and that its heritage is British. This is, perhaps, mainly because Paul Jones, who was in very truth, as he is always regarded in the United States, "the founder of the American navy," was, after all, a man of British birth who had learnt not only his seamanship, but his conception of naval organization and discipline and his theory of naval warfare, in the British school, rather than in that of contemporary France. He loved France, it is true, and he hated the England of his time. But he had made a profound study of naval history, and he knew that the secret of sea-power had been better grasped by this country than by her great rival of those days on the seas. There is extant a letter of his to the famous French Admiral Kersaint in which he makes this perfectly clear, in which, indeed, he anticipates by nearly a hundred years some of the most striking conclusions of Captain Mahan, declaring, in words which might have been written by Captain Mahan himself, that "the underlying principle and rule of action in the French navy have always been calculated to subordinate immediate or instant opportunities to ulterior, if not distant, objects." It was the "spirit of the eternal aggressive," derived from the history of the British navy in its conflicts with that of France, which Paul Jones desired to impress, alike by precept and by example, on the great navy he was destined to found; and it has, as our correspondent shows, survived to the present day. In spite of the many differences which distinguish the British navy from the American, they are, at any rate, united in this common and inspiring tradition. Perhaps, indeed, it is carried almost to an extreme in the younger navy of the two. According to our Correspondent, the officer of the new American navy almost despises the "sea habit," and holds that "any drill which is not for battle is a waste of time." If the recent cruise of the American fleet across two oceans had not triumphantly shown how thoroughly the American officer is master of his craft, we might almost be tempted to think that this alleged contempt of the "sea habit" savored unduly of what is known to some critics in this country as the "material" school of naval thought. It is, perhaps, rather to be regarded as an indirect consequence of the very slow rate of promotion which prevails in the American navy. The new American navy is still largely commanded in all the higher ranks by officers of the old school. "The admirals and captains of the present day received their education and formed their habits in the dead period after the Civil War, before the new navy came into being. The average age of reaching captain's rank is over fifty-five." Hence there is naturally some antagonism between the representatives of the old navy and those of the new. Impatience of the "sea habit" is engendered by the survival of obsolete drills, still dear to the old school, though they do not make for fighting efficiency. But there is not a little to be said for a school of naval thought, although it be dubbed "material," which makes shooting straight and hitting often at a range suitable to the gun the be-all and the end-all of naval training.

The antagonism here to be noted will probably die out as the old school passes out of the American navy, and the new rises to take its place. The singular thing is that the obvious remedy for it—namely the acceleration of promotion by the superannuation of inefficient seniors and the judicious selection of efficient juniors for promotion—does not seem to be greatly favored even by the new navy. This appears to be partly due to a laudable fear of the introduction of baleful political influences into the navy, partly, to a

## One View of the Dominion

In a recent issue of the Standard of Empire, Mr. Justice Longley, of Nova Scotia, wrote as follows: "The great and perhaps unpleasant conspicuousness which has been given to a very ordinary and certainly very loyal address delivered by me before the Canadian Club in New York a short time ago justifies me, I hope, in seeking an opportunity of addressing the readers of the new Empire newspaper, 'The Standard of Empire,' on the large problems which eminent authorities are discussing in its columns. I have read with care and interest the articles of Lord Milner, and with their general tone I entirely agree. Indeed, if he had been at the Canadian Club dinner in New York I would have been sure of his approbation of what I said as of that of Mr. Bryce, the British Ambassador at Washington, who is most absurdly represented as opposing or resenting my remarks. No loyal Briton could have found in them anything to oppose."

Lord Milner's proposition of Empire is a great advance upon earlier suggestions, such as Imperial Federation, etc. That all great self-governing committees should preserve their autonomy and, still acknowledging their allegiance to a common sovereign, and feeling pride in the greatness and integrity of a common Empire, seek means by which they can act together with a common purpose, is a proposal that seems within the rational and practical. Lord Milner recognizes that it is not without its difficulties and dangers, but it certainly has a chance as a problem. A Federal Parliament sitting in London and attempting to legislate for an Empire stretching over the whole globe never had the remotest chance of success, and its strenuous advocacy by some generous and enthusiastic souls had the unfortunate effect of creating prejudices against Imperialism which stand in the way of a fair-recognition of a more feasible scheme.

A few things can be taken for granted in this connection, and I think constitute common ground.

1. It is the interest of Great Britain to secure for all time the loyal sympathy and moral support of those portions of the Empire which are sometimes included in the term "Greater Britain."

2. At the present time the great self-governing dominions are in warm sympathy with the Empire, and profoundly loyal to the King. Perhaps it is not going too far to say, more intensely loyal than the people of the British islands.

3. It would be a splendid thing if, as these dominions increased in power, some means could be found for securing a permanent bond of union among them—all a bond which would not fetter the individual development of each, but act as a cohesive force for the strengthening of all.

These three things we all recognize as either existing facts or desirable aims. If they are to continue, the only ghost of a chance they have is through Lord Milner's proposition of autonomy. The Editor of "The Standard of Empire" has twice declared that I am singular in regarding Canada as a "Colony," which idea everybody else had long since discarded. With deference, I think this is a mere play upon words. "The Standard of Empire" is very careful to use the phrase "Oversea Dominions," and due credit must be given to those who very recently have heroically sought to drop the expression "the Colonies." But, nevertheless, the cold fact is that Canada is a Colony at this moment. A Governor-General is sent out to administer affairs in the name of the King. The Privy Council undertakes to advise His Majesty to reverse the judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada, which the Parliament of Canada have pronounced final. The very Constitution under which Canadian affairs are administered is the enactment of the Imperial Parliament, which alone can change it, and has the power to change it whenever it pleases—or even to repeal it. Canada is exercising some influence in treaties respecting her own particular interests, but she has no status

democratic feeling that a man who has served his country faithfully for forty years, and has at the outset of his career run the gauntlet of the drastic system of elimination which prevails at Annapolis, ought not to be called upon to yield the place he has won even to a more efficient junior. Nevertheless the paradox remains that, whereas the American bluejacket enters young and serves for a very short period afloat, he is commanded by officers who are entered at Annapolis for a four years' course up to the age of twenty, and do not in the average reach the rank of captain before they are fifty-five. "The average age of the crews of the battleship fleet is little over twenty-one." They enlist for a period of four years, and re-enlistment is far from common. American officers, moreover, apparently do not greatly favor the enlistment of men who have acquired the sea habit by previous experience of the sea. "They prefer farmers' sons from the heart of the land, who never saw salt water, to the youth of the wharves in seaport towns." That may well be, for mere life in a seaport town is not necessarily a good training for the naval or other service; but it is a little more surprising to learn that "the absence of sea habits and sea training is, in the eyes of the younger officers, little disadvantage. A taste for mechanics is considered far more useful aboard a battleship, where seamanship is but an incident to gunnery." It

in any foreign court except through the gracious indulgence of the Imperial Government. If the Foreign Minister gives his authority, then Canadian Ministers can negotiate with foreign Governments. This position is beyond cavil a Colonial relation—call it what euphonious term you like. And the word "Colony" is used daily in the parlance of London, and an Englishman has barely got his feet on the shores of Canada before he declares that he is delighted or otherwise with the "Colony."

I wish simply to pursue Lord Milner's proposition to its logical sequence, and see just what he means. Canada has now 7,000,000 people, as many as Queen Elizabeth reigned over when her navies destroyed the Spanish Armada. She has a volume of trade of \$650,000,000—so vastly greater than Great Britain had when George III. began to reign that comparison would be absurd. She has a revenue of \$100,000,000, and bank assets of \$950,000,000. This is a development greater than England had when she was recognized as a proud and mighty nation, and greater than many or most of the existing independent nations of the world.

But this is only today. Canada has the area of half a continent—nearly as great as Europe. Her progress now is phenomenal. She will certainly multiply her population and resources by two every thirty or thirty-five years. After sixty or seventy years we shall have a nation approximating 30,000,000 people, with revenue and resources to correspond. What then? I do not say that Canadians are discontented with existing conditions, or that the Colonial relation, as at present working, is irksome. But surely when we are considering problems of Empire we must look ahead. In 1990 will Canada have a Governor-General appointed by Downing-street? Will the Privy Council decide civil rights in Canada? Will the Canadian Constitution be subject to the will of the Parliament at Westminster? Will Canadian ministers have no status with foreign governments except with the assent of the Foreign Office in Downing-street? Perhaps not. I took the liberty of saying in New York that I thought otherwise—that the Colonial relation could not continue when Canada had the status of a nation. I repeat the opinion now. What does Lord Milner think about this? It is not quite open to propound an Imperial policy—something we are to rest upon and base our hopes and policy upon—and when we look ahead and ask questions to be told, "Wait until the issue arises." The issue is bound to arise. I wish to see this great Empire bound together as much as Lord Milner. I do not wish to see any separation between Canada and Great Britain or Canada and Australia. But I repeat that exactly existing relations cannot always continue. The majority of Canadians are of the lion's brood, and the French Canadians have no less national pride; and when the population of Canada is 30,000,000 and her revenue \$400,000,000—and probably much more before then—there will be felt the pulsations of national life and a desire to assume its full powers and responsibilities.

In seeking to comprehend just what is meant by the new form of Imperialism which Lord Milner so ably propounds, may I venture to ask him how far he recognizes that the developments of population, wealth and resources will recast the relations between great Commonwealths and Downing-street. If this factor is duly regarded I can see great hopes of a voluntary co-operation of equal and co-ordinate nations drawn together by mutual interest and good will. But to predicate that the affairs of great prospective nations like Canada and Australia should be always administered from Downing-street under existing conditions seems to me to invite confusion and collapse.

I cannot regard the Imperial Conference of 1907 as a total failure. It seems to me it adopted the only practical course open—namely, a means of securing future discussions in a friendly way of all problems of Imperial magnitude. Lord Milner thinks that matters of

rather goes against the grain of British naval tradition to put the matter in this way, but perhaps our correspondent and the officers whose opinions he records only mean to say that the art of the fighting seaman must be adapted to the ships in which he has to serve and the weapons with which he has to fight, and must for that reason be largely based in these days, on mechanical aptitudes and acquisitions. Be this as it may, no one will deny the gift of good seamanship to the American fleet now in Australasian waters, and though, as our correspondent shows, the methods of the American navy differ widely and in many respects from those of our own, yet each may congratulate the other on attaining the same ends, by methods which are most consonant to its native genius and institutions.

### AN AWAKENING EMPIRE

Missionaries, trade commissioners, soldiers and ambassadors having relations with the Chinese have brought to the west varying stories of the changes that have been wrought in that great empire since the rise of Japan and her recognition as a world power, writes the Toronto News. It has been said that foreign concession-holders are being expelled, that the army is being strengthened, that the people are learning that first national lesson of self-sufficiency. And to what end? Some

Imperial defence should have been disposed of. Perhaps I have no right to speak of Canadian sentiment. I certainly am not in public life, and only discuss these problems as a patriotic Canadian and a loyal Briton. But I venture to say with all frankness to Lord Milner that if he is relying upon the Canadian Parliament or people entering into any scheme of Imperial defence other than that which Parliament deems expedient for the defence of Canada, he is cherishing a delusion. Some unthinking people in Canada will raise a very loud cry if anyone makes a suggestion of independence, but let no one be deluded by this into a belief that the cry will not be equally loud if a proposition is made to contribute to an Imperial Army and Navy. If I am not blind and devoid of judgment, no serious thought of doing anything of the kind has entered the mind of any responsible public man in Canada. I should have imagined that Sir Wilfrid Laurier's attitude last summer would have made that reasonably clear. Co-operation for securing rapid transit between all parts of the Empire by land and sea was grateful to Sir Wilfrid. Periodical discussion of questions of common import between the different autonomous nations constituting the Empire, he favored, but no word implying a willingness even to discuss contributions to an Imperial military service, or to surrender an iota of supreme control over its own affairs by Canada can be found in his public utterances. He is in the very centre of political conflict, and his opponents are ready to seize upon the slightest incident to encompass his defeat; yet, since his return to Canada I have never seen in Press or Parliament a single criticism in respect of his action at the Conference.

One more reference to Lord Milner's admirable article, and I have done. He seems to think that the attitude of the British Government on the subject of preferential trade is dangerous to Imperial unity. With the greatest deference I venture to question this. I think the adoption of a policy of preference by the British Government would be a good thing for Canada—help along her trade—though this view is not universal. But I am profoundly sure that the attachment of Canadians to the Empire rests upon no question of a few cents duty on wheat, nor do I believe that giving a preference to some leading products of Canada in British markets would increase in the slightest degree the bonds of regard which now prevail. Such a question should be determined by the British people, solely with a view to British interests. If it is a good thing for the people of the British Islands, let them adopt it. How far England can stand alone on Free Trade against a world of protection is an open problem. But it is not, in my judgment, in any sense an Imperial problem. Canada will frame her tariff to suit herself; let Great Britain do likewise.

In his second article Lord Milner, in a gracious desire to vindicate what I actually said in New York, refers to me as "Poor Judge Longley." I am obliged for his efforts to set me right, and I have no doubt I would greatly profit by his knowledge and advice. But I hope he will not misunderstand me when I assure him I do not stand in need of his pity. During a long career in public life no doubt I made some enemies, though I do not know them, and no man who expresses his views frankly can fail to be misunderstood by some and misjudged by others; but I am fairly content with my relations with my fellow citizens in Canada. I have no views which I am afraid to utter in Canada, or, if occasion required, to present to the consideration of the British public at the heart of the Empire. In considering such a momentous problem as the maintenance and prestige of our great Empire it is never well to hug illusions or indulge in vague dreams. Frank discussion and a fearless facing of difficulties are the only means of reaching a sound basis, and to me it matters little whether any views I express command favor or disapproval today, so long as I feel sure they are honest and sound, and likely to command the sober second thought of a just people.

say that in due time the Mongolians may swarm across the plains of Europe to crush the nations of the earth, that they may be the Huns of a later age. This is the Yellow Peril, and despite the improbability of the tale, some imaginative publicists are fascinated by it. In the main Caucasians have failed to consider that China may have aspirations towards real greatness, by improving the condition of the people, by exploiting the vast resources of the country, and by stimulating the study of the modern sciences of industry, commerce and finance.

A Chinese student who conceals his name has written for the Westminster Review, a notable, even remarkable, article on "Political Parties in China." After citing some middle age history to show that one time China had a constitutional monarchy with a responsible, all-powerful Prime Minister, the writer explains the distrust and suspicion which the present Manchu dynasty has shown towards any measure of reform. For years it was high treason to form any party of a political character. But of late there has been a change. There is a Constitutional Monarchist party which wants to keep China an Empire and to support the dynasty. This party is well organized, and is supported by a number of well-edited newspapers and periodicals. The Revolutionary or Republican party desires freedom from the abuses of government, now

so common, and sees in a republic the only salvation. The Constitutional Democrats believe that the people must be prepared for an improved government. Therefore, they advocate the widest possible education, particularly in technical science.

But all three parties have some common ground. They agree in fighting the existing political inequality. They all find inspiration in the slogan "China for the Chinese." This is not indicative of a "closed door" policy, nor is it anti-foreign. The writer says: "I do not know what definition has been given for the expression, 'Australia for the Australians,' or 'Canada for the Canadians,' but 'China for the Chinese' means that the Chinese people will maintain their national rights against anyone from within or without who attempts to endanger them."

In the opinion of Chinese reformers, communication is the vital need of the Empire. Therefore, they believe that railway concessions to foreigners are a menace to China. The Manchurian Railway concession was the principal line of the Russo-Japanese war. Troops were necessary to "protect" the line, and finally these troops occupied the whole country. So China wants hereafter to build its own railways. It has already some 500 miles constructed, part of which was built by a Chinese engineer. Chinese engineers are increasing, and will increase. There are valuable mines in the Empire. It is the ambition of the Chinese to open and develop these mines without incurring the danger of admitting foreign capital and perhaps a subsequent "protective" armed force.

The writer says the Renaissance has begun. Neither the brute force of Europe nor the arbitrary traditions of the Orient can stop it. All that Europe is asked to do is to remain neutral, and to give Chinese students every opportunity for qualifying themselves for the struggle. Mending an Empire is no task for immaturity. It demands broad-minded, cultured, educated and astute men, whose abilities can keep pace with their patriotism. A China revived and remade is not likely to develop citizens who would emulate the exploits of the hordes who followed Atilla into Europe in the middle of the fifth century.

### A CHILD'S LOVE

To tell a child that it is a duty to love God better than father or mother, sisters or brothers, better than play, or stories, or food, or toys—what a monstrous thing is that! It is one of the things that make religion into a dreary and darkling shadow, that haunts the path of the innocent. The child's love is all for tangible, audible and visible things. Love for him means kind words and smiling looks, ready comfort and lavished kisses; the child does not even love things for being beautiful, but for being what they are—curious, characteristic, interesting. He loves the old frowsy smell of the shut-up attic, the bright, ugly ornaments of the chimney-piece, the dirt of the street. He has no sense of critical taste. "Besides, words mean so little to him, or even bear odd, fantastic associations, which no one can divine, and which he himself is unable to express; he has no notion of an abstract, essential, spiritual thing, apart from what is actual to his senses."

And then into this little concrete mind, so full of small definite images, so faltering and frail, is thrust this vast, remote notion—that he is bound to love something hidden and terrible, something that looks at him from the blank sky when he is alone among the garden-beds, something which haunts empty rooms and the dark brake of the woodland. Moreover, a child, with its preternatural sensitiveness to pain, its bewildered terror of punishment, learns, side by side with this, that the God whom he is to love thus tenderly is the God who lays about Him so fiercely in the Old Testament, slaying the innocent with the guilty, merciless, harsh, inflicting the irreparable stroke of death, where a man would be concerned with desiring amendment more than vengeance. The simple questions with which the man Friday poses Robinson Crusoe, and to which he receives so ponderous an answer, are the questions which naturally arise in the mind of any thoughtful child. Why, if God be so kind and loving, does He not make an end of evil at once? Yet, because such questions are unanswerable by the wisest, the child is, for the convenience of his education, made to feel that he is wicked if he questions what he is taught.—Putnam's Magazine.

### SUBMARINES AS TOWBOATS

The submarine of the British navy is a very versatile sort of craft and even in time of peace is made useful in various ways. It seems strange to think that it should be converted into a tow-boat, but this is a common custom at the naval stations of England. If a tug or other surface boat does not happen to be available and a submarine is at the dock its commander may receive an order to move a barge, a lighter or some other vessel. The submarine is preferred to the ordinary tow-boat where the tow has a cargo of dangerous material. So it is that barges loaded with inflammable oils, powder, gun cotton and other explosives are often taken from place to place by the submarine, especially when these stores are to be placed on board a warship.

The reason for this is that as the submarine is propelled by an electric or gas generating motor it has no funnel from which heat or sparks can be emitted, and thus the danger of fire is avoided. Those in the British navy are provided with very powerful motors, and are so strongly built that apparently this sort of work does not seem to strain or injure them in any way whatsoever.

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