

No evidence
of retraction
by Economist

radio public affairs producer, who later interviewed Gray on his program.

But not all results were positive. *The Economist*, evidently taking its line without question from the Central Generating Board, included CANDU in an article on February 9 as among the "obsolete" reactors. A member of a union group who had attended a meeting with Gray had a letter to the editor published in *The Economist* of March 2 criticizing the article and defending CANDU and Britain's SGHWR. But my own reading of *The Economist* since then, and a request to its editorial offices in preparation for writing this article, produced no evidence of retraction. Nor was Industrial Editor Keith Richardson of *The Sunday Times* swayed. In its March 31 edition, he wrote a two-page article explaining, as the headline put it: "Why Britain Must Buy U.S. Nuclear Power."

Happily, in the end Britain decided

not to buy American but to stick with own reactor technology and work out a with Canada for technology-sharing in pressure-tube reactor field. The decision was made in July 1974. Had we made ourselves, we at the High Commission were involved in the campaign, public private, could not have been more con-

It was icing on the public diplomatic cake when *Scientific American* came out in its October 1975 edition with a full-length feature thoroughly examining the CANDU and comparing it with American light water reactors. The article was written as a result of representations made to New York editors by the magazine's London-based European representative who heard about CANDU through the Canada House press office. Among the points the article makes is this: "... the CANDU system is at least competitive with current U.S. nuclear generating systems." That's obsolete?

Nuclear policy should be more open and less ambiguous

Albert Legault

France has been accused, rightly or wrongly, of contributing to the development of Israel's nuclear program, since Israel initially used a French nuclear reactor to obtain the fissionable materials necessary for the manufacture of nuclear bombs. In some circles it is suggested that the Indian nuclear "device" tested in 1974, for so-called peaceful purposes, was largely the product of Canadian technology, particularly as it involved Indian nuclear

reactors built in close co-operation with Canada.

It does appear that it was with the Trombay Canada-India Reactor (CIR) that India isolated the plutonium necessary for the manufacture of its first nuclear "device". It also appears that India used its own natural uranium — which has in plentiful supply — to obtain the plutonium. In consequence, Canada would be responsible only to the extent of providing Canadian technology — and not fissionable materials — served indirectly to speed up a process India had already started. Morally the whole question is, therefore, whether or not India could actually have developed its nuclear program without Canadian nuclear assistance. Of course, no one will ever be able to answer this question, because it is impossible to create a previous situation that could be tested with a hypothesis formulated after the fact. In any case, the most astonishing thing about it is Canada's surprise.

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