

If the Cuban question is raised you might wish to make the following points:

(a) Canada deplores many of the practices of the Castro régime and in particular shares the concern of the United States over the tendency of the Castro régime to become increasingly oriented towards the Soviet bloc.

(b) Concerning the nature of the Castro régime, we recognize its dictatorial character, but are not sure that the use of the term "socialist" by Castro in his May Day speech is necessarily conclusive proof of the complete adherence of Cuba to the Soviet bloc. There would still appear to be a strong nationalist element in the present Cuban system. Whatever the real nature of the present Cuban régime, it is clear that many of the social and economic changes introduced during the past year or so cannot be reversed readily, if at all, by a mere change of government.

(c) We would prefer to see the Cubans themselves determine their future course, since outside interference (however well-intentioned) may do more harm than good.

(d) We think that any international action should at least carry the judgment of the main Latin-American countries.

(e) While we are aware of the provocation to which the United States has been subjected, and are conscious of the strong feelings now existing between the two countries, we wonder whether the possibility of negotiation should be entirely ruled out. Whether or not such negotiation would be likely to yield any concrete results, it would be a pity for the United States to appear to be in the position of refusing even to talk.

(f) The note from President Dorticos concerning the Cuban Government's alleged desire to discuss matters with the United States does not specifically call for a reply from the governments to which it was addressed. If, however, the general view is that a reply should be given, the Canadian delegation would suggest that any such communication should note the declared willingness of the Cuban authorities to participate in discussions and should express the hope that the Cuban Government would do its part to help create conditions in which fruitful negotiations might become practicable.

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*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in United States  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1441

Washington, May 5, 1961

SECRET. CANADIAN EYES ONLY. OPIMMEDIATE.

Reference: Our Tel 1333 Apr 26.

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By Bag Havana, Mexico, Lima, Santiago, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Port-au-Prince, Trujillo, Caracas, Port-of-Spain, Bogotá, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Guatemala from Ottawa, Moscow from London.

CUBA

We had the opportunity of a further word yesterday with Achilles, the Head of the new Operations Center as it is called in the State Department. This office, which works in close relationship to the Secretary, is still primarily concerned with the Cuban problem and from our