

## INCLUSION OF GREECE AND TURKEY IN NATO

1. It may be useful to comment briefly at this preliminary stage on the United States proposal to include Greece and Turkey as full members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization while this matter is receiving active consideration in Ottawa.<sup>46</sup>

2. The United States memorandum bases its case for strengthening security arrangements between the western powers and Greece and Turkey on "both political and military considerations" (paragraph 1). My impression of the memorandum is that it primarily reflects the pressure of military thinking rather than a careful balancing of political and economic factors as well as purely military considerations. Further, while it would not be difficult to reach agreement on the proposition that the security arrangements between Greece and Turkey and the western powers should be strengthened, it is a considerable jump from this conclusion to the conclusion in paragraph 7 that this objective can best be attained by the inclusion of Greece and Turkey as full signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with the consequent changes in the form and structure of the NATO concept which such a step would imply.

3. For example, the memorandum deals only with two possibilities: (a) a Mediterranean treaty including Greece and Turkey; and (b) the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in NATO. It does not deal with either the possibility (listed in sub-paragraph 4(c) of your despatch No. S.1662 of April 20) of a direct United States guarantee of military assistance to Turkey in the case of Soviet attack, or of a new tripartite guarantee (referred to in your sub-paragraph 4(d)) in which the three western great powers would participate. We feel that before reaching the conclusion that full membership is the best solution, these two alternative possibilities should be seriously explored by the United States and major powers concerned. From the Canadian point of view, the inclusion of Greece and Turkey in the treaty would, of course, extend our legal defence commitments to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. It should, however, be noted that if Greece or Turkey should be attacked at the present time, the obligation of all the NAT countries (including Canada) to render assistance would be powerful. There is also the fact that the present uncertainty concerning the position of Greece and Turkey presents a temptation to Soviet expansionism whereas steps to increase their present security arrangements whether through inclusion in NATO or by a direct United States guarantee would act as a deterrent in an area of great strategic importance. It may also be that a NATO guarantee within the defensive framework of the treaty would be less provocative at this time to the Soviet Union than a unilateral guarantee extended to Turkey by the United States.

4. The political factors listed in paragraph 2 of the United States memorandum are really military factors and the considerations to which you refer in paragraph 4(a) of your despatch under reference, to which we have always attached great importance, are passed over rather hurriedly in paragraph 6 of the United States paper. For many of its members the North Atlantic Treaty has always been consid-

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<sup>46</sup> Voir/See United States, Department of State, *FRUS*, 1951, Volume III, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981, pp. 520-522.