

NATO

referring to the fact that the major combatants find themselves within the ambit of this particular organization. More recently this view has been given some validity by the fact that the NATO organization is its flexible response.

Since the discovery and realization of the nuclear weapon, it has been necessary for man to indicate what limits are involved in attempting to prevent or protect himself from aggression. The argument of flexible response has been used often and loudly. The suggestion that without it every provocation would become a danger, not only to the peace of Europe but the very security of the whole world, is an interesting argument. I think it is more than a little possible to argue from the other side. It has been suggested that once we have accepted the fact of a flexible response, then we give an indication not only to our allies but to our potential enemies that we are willing to suffer certain levels of hostility rather than press that button for massive retaliation.

Some may argue that is a weak, if not a ludicrous, argument. If that is so, we have not fully considered the implications of what occurred in Czechoslovakia last summer. What did we learn from Czechoslovakia? Most of us seem to be of the opinion that we learned Russia is still extremely aggressive. I find this to be no particular surprise because I think we have known that all along. We discovered with the invasion or occupation of Czechoslovakia the lightning speed with which Russia could move her forces. The NATO organization, in fact, made this great discovery. If it was a new discovery for NATO intelligence headquarters, it makes me a little uncomfortable about the accuracy of our intelligence. Next, and most important, is the belief that the knowledge of a flexible response, both in the east and west, was sufficient for the Russians to believe that they could occupy Czechoslovakia without greatly endangering their own security or that of their allies in the Warsaw Pact. It may not be an argument acceptable to many, but I think it is well worth considering in these changing times.

A large body of opinion in our time is that, militarily at least, NATO has been successful. If that is true, what then is our answer to those who subsequently ask, what about political success? As long as Germany remains divided in the heart of this confrontation, and as long as Russian leaders and

Russian people suffer from the extreme German paranoia which I believe exists, we cannot believe we have secured very much either for ourselves or for our allies in what has been happening to date within the context of this alliance.

It is my purpose here this evening to raise basic questions which I think must be considered if we are in any way to have some sense in our foreign and military policies. What are the greatest dangers in 1969 to our national security? Who has told us in an official way in this debate what it is that we should fear most? I cannot recall the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau), the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Sharp) or the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux) indicating to us in some definite way what these first priorities are. How have they, as the custodians of the government of this country, perceived the real threat which faces our own national security? We are in a rather strange situation when discussing military or foreign matters. We talk about defending ourselves and our security, yet we never point to what are our greatest dangers. We are a little like that well known fable about the emperor in the great parade going down the street of a very large city. Everyone is watching it go by, cheering and applauding this great man when suddenly a little child says, "He has no clothes". This is what has been happening so often in our debates on vital matters of defence and security.

We have not clearly stated the greatest threat to our national security. If I were to make that challenge in this debate, I would immediately hear from all sides of this house, "communism"! I am not afraid to use the word. We are afraid that communism is at the root of the danger to our national security. What form of communism is it we fear? Is it the Russian variety, Chinese, Yugoslavian, Albanian, Czechoslovakian, Rumanian, Polish, East German or some other form? Presumably, we have made some determination on one or all these different kinds of which we have some fear.

● (9:00 p.m.)

Yet in 1949, when we put together the Alliance that we used in one major way to cover the danger from this potential threat, we did not have to ask ourselves any questions with regard to these different forms of communism. I might also ask, if the threat is real why has communist success been so