

II. In our opinion, further negotiation could bring about full agreement.

The fifth example: Both plans contain proposals designed to prohibit the wider spread of nuclear weapons. A resolution submitted by Ireland, calling for international agreement in this field, was endorsed by all the members of the United Nations at the sixteenth session of the general assembly, just a few months ago. What is required now is early action to bring this recommendation into force.

The sixth example: The United States program and the Soviet draft treaty both call for reductions of conventional arms in the first stage. The Soviet plan provides for reductions proportionate to manpower cuts. At our second meeting, the representative of the United States put forward new proposals calling for a reduction by 30 per cent. My delegation believes that this development brings the views of the two major military powers closer together. Detailed negotiations should begin at once to remove remaining differences.

My seventh example is as follows: In the crucial field of nuclear disarmament the positions of the two sides have likewise been brought substantially closer by the significant new United States proposals for a 30 per cent reduction of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in the first stage. The Soviet draft treaty calls for the complete elimination of all such vehicles in the opening stage. Nevertheless, having in mind the magnitude of the initial cuts proposed by the United States, as well as the agreed principle of balance, my delegation believes that detailed negotiation should bring the two major military powers to agreement on phased reductions in this field.

In these seven areas, and there are probably others, we believe that an appreciable measure of common ground already exists. There is a second category of problems in which there remain more pronounced and generally well known differences between the two sides. I shall not dwell on them today, with the exception of the vital issue of stopping nuclear weapons tests, which requires special mention.

Canada deeply regretted that the Soviet union last August broke a three year moratorium on testing, for we are opposed to all nuclear weapon tests. In this we share the view of most other countries. Indeed, the major nuclear powers themselves have stated at this very conference that they would like to see all tests stopped. However, they now find themselves unable to reach final accord owing to disagreement on inspection. Is there no alternative to another series of tests with all the harmful consequences that such action

could bring? Is it not possible, within the framework of this committee, to make the further effort which is required to break the deadlock? In my opinion, such an effort must be made, for otherwise the prospects of this conference itself could be seriously threatened. We already see, in dispatch after dispatch, stories that this disarmament conference is doomed to failure. These stories are based on the talks on nuclear weapon tests which have taken place between the nuclear powers and in which the other representatives at this conference have not been involved at all. In the minds of the public the impression has been created, because of the disagreement in these nuclear test talks, that this conference is going to be a failure. This, I submit, is a very bad situation, and one which I hope will be clarified by the correspondents of all our countries. As a start, it would be most helpful to receive a report on these informal talks which have been taking place on this subject from the three participants. Countries which do not possess nuclear weapons cannot put a stop to these tests; however, we can and do appeal to the nuclear states to do everything in their power to see that a solution is not further delayed.

There is a third category of problems in which the extent and the nature of the disagreement between the two sides are far from clear. As representatives will have noticed, I referred earlier to cases where there is disagreement but where that disagreement is clear cut and everyone understands what it is. What is required to resolve this third category of differences is, in the first instance, an intensive discussion which will demonstrate precisely what the positions of the two sides are. We must find out exactly the position taken by the two sides. To avoid continued misunderstanding, the respective interests of the two sides should be brought into the light of day and the possibility of an accommodation of views examined in good faith.

One of the most fundamental problems requiring this kind of examination is the question of verification. Canada's willingness to contribute to a verified system of disarmament has been demonstrated by the offer which my government has made, and which still stands, to throw open its northern areas for inspection in exchange for comparable rights in corresponding areas of Soviet territory.

In the opinion of my delegation, the best way to achieve a realistic solution of the problem of verification is to avoid any further discussion in the abstract. We should avoid abstract debates on the word "verification". Instead, there should be careful examination of each measure of disarmament together with the specific verification procedures to