

has tended to become known among the Chinese; and, in general, I think that Canadians are regarded in a friendly light.

Q. And what about the attitude of the communists?—A. Well, when we speak of the Chinese we generally regard them as one group.

Q. I am not speaking about the Chinese people generally, I am speaking about the communists and the communist government.—A. Well, I think probably they have no more affection for us than they have for any of the other western powers, although the size of our country is not as likely to draw attention.

Q. Is there any distinction between an American on the one hand and any of the others, including ourselves?—A. I think probably the United States has been singled out at the present time as the target of the anti-imperialist propaganda. Usual propaganda technique would seem to be to focus attention on one country, and the United States seems to be the principal one at the present time.

Q. What extra features would flow from recognition of this regime in China, apart from the usual ones and apart from this extraordinary one of the communistic government taking its place on the permanent seat at the United Nations; are there any other permanent features that flow from recognition?—A. The question of Chinese representatives abroad certainly creates a problem in all countries, especially where there may be a sizeable Chinese population, such as in Malaya; and there is the question of Chinese representation in a vast group of international organizations besides the United Nations, organizations like the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council in Japan; and the question as to how this will affect the Japanese peace treaty negotiations; and other factors of that kind that have to be considered and taken into account.

Q. What results can be expected in these smaller countries south of China? I am thinking particularly of Siam and Burma, where communist agents have been very busy already stirring up all kinds of trouble. Is there any reason to expect more trouble, or the manifestation of more trouble if Chinese communists marched down to the northern borders of those countries?—A. I think that is a very difficult question to answer. There are factors which bear on both sides. You raised two angles on that question. One was the appearance of communist troops on the borders of the country. Now, that certainly is going to have a disquieting effect, particularly in French Indo-China. Burma has a rather hazardous border that is very mountainous and it is not easy to push over that border, particularly with the decay of the Burma Road. It certainly would create a problem on the borders of Indo-China, but I am sure that the people of Indo-China and the government there will be aware of it.

*By Mr. Green:*

Q. Can you tell us something about the Far Eastern Commission?—A. Yes; what part of its activities would you like to know about?

Q. Is it really taking any part whatever in the determination of the policy in Japan?—A. Well, the Far Eastern Commission was set up, as you know, early in 1946 with eleven powers represented on it. I have its terms of reference here but I am sure you do not want those. It was to develop principles and policies that the Japanese government itself should adhere to in fulfilling the terms of the surrender signed on the U.S.S. *Missouri* on September 2, 1945. At the same time it was not to interfere directly in the administration of Japan which was the responsibility of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

The Far Eastern Commission was to arrive at its decisions—so-called policy decisions—by a majority vote but with the concurrence of the four big powers—China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom. It was originally envisaged that it would perhaps operate for a two or three year period prior to the convening of the Japanese peace conference. The difficulties that