

thereby ensure our own. However, in present circumstances, we must pursue partial objectives both for their intrinsic value and as a foundation for future progress. This has been the function of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee since the last session of the Assembly. While we are disappointed that the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee has had only limited success, we nevertheless consider that it remains the best available forum for the negotiation of arms-control agreements.

There is no cause more urgent than to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. No single measure, however, will provide a solution. A series of measures directed to various facets of the issue will be required.

First, there is widespread agreement that a non-proliferation treaty is imperative. On the central issue of the definition of proliferation, we believe that the formula must prevent nuclear weapons from passing into the control of additional states or groups of countries. This should not be inconsistent with legitimate measures of collective defence. The exhaustive discussion of non-proliferation by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva has made it quite clear what the obstacles to a final agreement are, and it is to be hoped that the great powers will find it possible to remove these obstacles and to leave the way clear for the agreement which the world so greatly wants and needs.

Secondly, as an essential corollary to a non-proliferation agreement, we think that the nuclear powers and the United Nations should urgently consider ways of extending meaningful guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon states who have foregone the right to acquire nuclear weapons. We think that such states should have assurances for their security against nuclear attack or the threat of it.

Thirdly, it is in our view essential that, if such a treaty is to be effective, and if it is to inspire confidence, some means of verification should be included. We have taken a stand at Geneva for a provision incorporating the mandatory application of International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent safeguard to all international transfers of nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes.

Fourthly, we must persist in our efforts to devise an acceptable formula for a treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments. To this end, Canada has sought to further the science of teleseismic detection by increasing our capacity to process data from seismic arrays and by supporting increased international exchanges of such data.

Fifthly, we support the efforts being made in Latin America and in Africa to establish nuclear-free zones. We hope it may be possible subsequently for such zones to be established elsewhere in the world where conditions are appropriate.

Sixthly, we believe that progress towards effective measures of arms control requires the participation of all the principal world powers in the discussion of these questions. We think that the non-aligned countries have a special role in trying to persuade the People's Republic of China to participate in such discussions.