

-A **ban on investment** in Nigeria would carry minimal coercive impact, but would publicize the issue, and would be unlikely to hurt Nigerian civilians.

-A **ban on imports of oil production equipment** into Nigeria would require U.S. support in order to be meaningful.

-**Restrictions on trade credits** to Nigeria could represent a good means of inflicting short-term pressure on the regime.

-A **ban on the import of luxury goods** to Nigeria is a sound idea.

-Support for **travel/visa restrictions** needs to be broadened. These restrictions should be sharpened in order to target elites while sparing students, trade unionists, and other opposition members.

-**Cutting off air and land links** to Nigeria would not be helpful unless states such as France and the U.K. sever air links, and unless Nigeria's neighbours cut off land routes. This is unlikely to occur.

-It would be effective to **block hard currency transactions related to Nigeria's oil trade**, thereby producing a "virtual embargo." However, this would require the cooperation of the U.S. and U.K.

-A **comprehensive oil embargo** would undoubtedly prove painful to the regime, but would be politically very difficult to organize and maintain. It would also produce negative humanitarian consequences for Nigeria's poor, and particularly its women and children. Any such embargo should only be undertaken after an assessment mission gauges its likely humanitarian effects, and only if a plan is in place to mitigate these effects.

-The idea of a **ban on importing Nigerian oil into Canada** received broad support, but it was noted that, under Canadian law, such an act would require a prior "international agreement" among states taking part in the ban. The exact nature of such an agreement is unclear; it is something more onerous than a bilateral agreement, but less onerous than a decision by the U.N. Security Council.

-An **embargo on importing refined petroleum products into Nigeria** would be quite painful to the regime, but would also carry humanitarian consequences. It might be fruitful to link such a "stick" to the "carrot" of helping Nigeria to develop an independent fuel production capacity, in exchange for political reforms.

-Participants agreed that it is appropriate to **increase the level of aid to Nigeria's opposition**, and to other progressive elements of Nigerian civil society.

-Positive incentives or "**carrots**" are an attractive means of inducing political change. They are unlikely to cause humanitarian suffering, and are more likely to be supported by states which would not condone the use of sanctions. **Suggested carrots include:** the provision of relief aid in exchange for the release of political prisoners, offers of military training and assistance in exchange for the military's return to barracks, pledges of amnesty for criminals in the regime, and offers of debt relief as a means to reinforce ongoing reforms.