

capabilities would probably provide more information to CITA if they were assured that it would protect selected parts of it from global dissemination. Proprietary commercial information, such as might be discovered in the work of the IAEA, OPCW, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or a future BTWC verification agency, would have to be protected.

While transparency is an important objective, it will be necessary, therefore, to temper it with the needs of confidentiality. Details of incoming information may have to be protected, but the conclusions of its analysis made more widely available, with summaries published for general distribution.

Identifying Needs

A national unit equivalent to CITA normally has a broad mandate to collect, collate and analyze information. In the United Nations, however, this type of mandate cannot be assumed. Certainly, CITA could routinely collect economic, geographic, social and low-grade political information on any state or issue that concerns the UN. It could also collect information on UN-mandated missions and treaties, presumably under the authority of the Security Council. These two general activities would be useful, but they might not use the full potential of CITA.

The most pressing information need in the field of peace operations is for data and opinion that would help the Secretary-General and the Security Council identify brewing troubles and growing potential threats to international peace and security. The historic dilemma for the United Nations, and for CITA, is that the UN has been reluctant to name an aggressor state or point to a situation that poses a threat before the problem has already become serious. Investigations of states and regions by the United Nations prior to open hostilities — that is, a presumption of aggressiveness — are contrary to the UN Charter and would certainly be resisted by Member States, if only on principle. On the other hand, the Secretary-General can initiate preventive diplomacy.

CITA might overcome this difficulty by

maintaining a “general information watch” in all regions, coupled with a capability to intensify its collection activities in stages appropriate to deteriorating situations. In any case, the mechanism for managing this process would always be highly political and depend on authorities outside CITA.

Handling of Non-Compliance

A perennial question asked regarding arms control agreements is “after non-compliance, what?” This is a sensitive question, to which past experiences have provided few satisfactory answers. One possible response has been the introduction of economic or other sanctions, under the mandate of the Security Council. In such a case, CITA could provide a valuable service in the collection and analysis of the economic information necessary for effective design of a program, and in verifying the success of the measures after they have been initiated.

CITA should issue factual determinations only. It should be absolved of all direct responsibility for dispute resolution, for making public judgments regarding failure to comply with undertakings, or for rulings establishing sanctions or other punishments which might follow.

While judgments, condemnations and penalties will have to be carried out by some other body, it could be possible for such a body to enlist the assistance of selected members of CITA to assist it in compliance consultations or other deliberations, and CITA’s analytical capabilities should always be at the disposal of the Secretary-General. But the focus of CITA should be on monitoring rather than actual verification judgments.

Fitting CITA into the United Nations

CITA could play an important role in facilitating the decision making and policy development of the United Nations, as well as in contributing to the training necessary for effective conduct of verification, confidence building and peace operations. Because CITA will be joining an established political entity, it must find an appropriate place and modus

