

J105(A83)

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Proposal Abstract J105(A83)

1. **Arms Control Problem:**
Nuclear weapons - cruise missiles
2. **Verification Type:**
Remote sensors - satellite
3. **Source:**
Longstreth, T.K. "Cruise Missiles: The Arms Control Challenge".
Arms Control Today 13, no.4 (May 1983): 1-11.
4. **Summary:**

This article states that cruise missiles pose "unprecedented difficulties" for verification of arms control agreements. In particular, submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), which were not effectively dealt with in the SALT II agreement, pose special problems. Cruise missiles are much smaller than ballistic missiles and can be launched from a number of different platforms. This creates difficulties for monitoring launches and support facilities using satellites and other national technical means. Deployment plans for SLCMs create further verification obstacles; SLCMs may be placed aboard traditionally non-strategic vessels (surface combatants and attack submarines), they may be deployed with non-nuclear SLCMs from which they are indistinguishable and, if they are placed in torpedo rooms of submarines and launched from torpedo tubes, they will be impossible to detect and count.

A ban on all types of SLCMs would be the most attractive arms control solution, but this is not likely to be advocated because of SLCM versatility, lethality and cost which makes them useful in the eyes of defense planners. Nonetheless, a ban on SLCMs with a land-attack capability, i.e. those SLCMs with ranges in excess of the longest anti-ship version, could be verifiable through monitoring flight test telemetry and other observable missile characteristics such as fuel consumption rate and estimated fuel capacity which give indications of range capabilities. The author cautions that such a ban would be difficult to negotiate because of the advanced stage of American and Soviet long-range SLCM testing, but notes that a Soviet START proposal included restrictions on SLCMs with ranges above 372 miles. It might also be possible to reduce counting and verification problems by prohibiting SLCM deployment aboard attack submarines (the most difficult platform for counting) or by designating ships and submarines that carry long-range SLCMs as strategic systems and hence subject to limitations.