

of plenty in which it would have been easier for them to start anew. One wonders whether this measure was taken to maintain socio-political equilibrium in Guinea-Bissau or to avoid creating anti-Angolan sentiment on the mainland.

Whatever the case, one should not attach too much significance to this possible reserve on the part of Cape Verde, and Agostinho Neto, who at one time was posted there by the Portuguese, included the archipelago in his official visit to West Africa. For the moment, therefore, we may conclude that, whatever the feeling on the islands towards Angola may be as far as the heads of the PAIGC are concerned, Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde have every reason to rejoice at the MPLA victory.

### Mozambique

The same is true in Mozambique, where President Samora Machel still claims to be forming the first genuinely socialist African state — a claim, incidentally, that the half-dozen other aspirants to this title must find somewhat displeasing. It is conceivable that his activism in foreign policy is a way of running away from domestic difficulties. It has, however, procured him a supply of Soviet heavy arms that, in the absence of enemies on the Rhodesian border, may well satisfy the professional aspirations of the Mozambique army and check the opponents, now no longer European but African, who find his rule decidedly heavy-handed. Of the four sister countries, Mozambique has so far gained the most from the MPLA victory; in addition to the reduction of the latent threat on its western border, victory has consolidated Mozambique's internal strength, helped it to recover from the closing of the railway lines to Rhodesia, and provided it with a few arguments to use in its negotiations with Pretoria.

The remaining country, the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, cannot yet afford to have enemies in Luanda. During the recent colonial period, all air communications, and even supply operations, were carried out *via* Luanda. The MLSTP, headed by Pinto da Costa, who is also the head of the state, is the weakest of the four parties so far as militant traditions, leadership material and organization are concerned. It is also a movement that is only slightly tinged with Marxism, as it seems about to enter the orbit of Gabon, which at times has been flirting with the idea of a flexible federation with the archipelago. Faced with a drop in cacao and coffee production owing to the departure of the planters and their white and Cape Verdian employees, with

the almost complete nationalization of the *rocas* (plantations) and with the lack of technicians and a distaste for manual labour (which has long been associated with slavery), São Tomé and Príncipe are clinging to survival after having avoided a leftist crisis in March 1975. Like Cape Verde, this tiniest of the African micro-republics has had to face an influx of thousands of São Tomé refugees from Angola. With nowhere to go in São Tomé and Príncipe, must they now move on to prosperous Gabon? Angola, which at present must rebuild and stabilize itself, would have difficulty in protecting these unfortunate islands, which are looking increasingly towards moderate Africa.

### Consolidation

To summarize, one need not be an expert to determine that, from a political viewpoint, the MPLA victory consolidated the position of the other regimes that resulted from the same struggle. It was inevitable that this should happen. Three of the countries — Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe — have derived no direct political benefit, as no one is seriously thinking of threatening them at this time. The Eastern-bloc countries have extended their influence to various degrees, but not to such an extent that they are able to lay down the law. In reality these three political entities, whose economic viability is questionable, are going through an extremely unstable period. In seeking to broaden the base of their support from outside, they are trying to play their political and strategic cards in a way that will give them more political elbow room, as is indicated by their participation in the France-Africa meeting in Paris last May. By aligning themselves with the French-speaking African states, these three Portuguese-speaking countries, whose combined population is scarcely over one million, hope to find allies who will give them as much freedom as possible, now that Portugal is no longer interested in its former colonies. Their small size and population have the advantage at least of not requiring more administrative personnel than could in the long term be trained by the PAIGC and the MLSTP.

The situation in Mozambique will require of its leaders at least as much skill and strength of character as is expected of the MPLA in Angola. In Mozambique there is a potentially explosive combination of factors unparalleled in the three micro-states. Among them are the following: an increase in the personal power of the President, failure of the party to

Foreign policy  
activism  
to escape  
domestic  
difficulties