

5. Wershof wondered whether, in view of the importance of USSR cooperation to the future of the Agency, any thought had been given to the possibility of the President raising this question with Khrushchev during his forthcoming visit. This notion had occurred to Canadian officials but opinion was divided as to whether it would be useful or not repeat not. It seemed to him that if such a discussion were to be of value, it should relate to cooperation on some important and constructive activity in IAEA (such as safeguards). A discussion of generalities, resulting in a general reference in a joint communiqué to improved cooperation in IAEA, might be more dangerous than useful.

6. Wilcox replied that this possibility was being considered.<sup>525</sup> The problem was, of course, the degree of priority which should be given to the various topics which might be discussed by the President and Khrushchev. One factor in favour of a discussion of IAEA was the fact that the Agency was close to the President's heart and the President felt that it potentially represented one of his real contributions to human welfare. Wilcox himself continued to think that the USSR had a genuine interest in preventing the spread of atomic weapons and that this provided a basis for cooperation, although the USSR had admittedly other conflicting interests in the Agency.

7. Wilcox then turned to the Agency's next general conference, saying that the USA hoped to announce that it would ask its partners in bilateral civil atomic energy agreements to agree to transfer to the Agency those functions under these agreements which the Agency was capable of performing. Although the USA had not repeat not yet approached any of its partners, it was confident that Japan, for example, would agree to transfer bilateral safeguards to the Agency once the latter had adopted its safeguards system. Apart from this, the USA considered that there were a number of positive new tasks which the Agency could undertake. This involved placing less emphasis on the original great objectives of the Agency and more on modest tasks which would keep it usefully occupied and more on modest tasks which would keep it usefully occupied pending a change in the international atmosphere.

8. Wershof agreed that the Agency could do useful work in establishing codes and standards and in making studies of problems within its competence. Health standards and waste disposal came to mind but these raised the problem of conflicting jurisdiction with the specialized agencies; in this connection it was essential that the USA use its influence to bring about a rational result. IAEA also had a useful function to perform in technical assistance but it was important to secure larger contributions from those member countries which were not repeat not now contributing adequately. However, in his opinion, even these various functions hardly justified the existence of the large organization which had been built up in Vienna.

9. Wells (International Relations — USAEC) intervened to say that USAEC had been reviewing its attitude towards IAEA and remained convinced that it was worth trying to develop the Agency's role by transferring to it functions from the USA's bilateral agreements and by assigning to it new tasks such as, for example, the drafting of a convention on third party liability for seagoing ships transporting nuclear materials and possibly the development of small power reactors for underdeveloped countries.

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<sup>525</sup> Il semble que cela n'ait pas été fait. Voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*, Volume X (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), document 126.

This was apparently not done. See *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*, Volume X (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), document 126.