

so, then science has not as much permanence as Christian dogma, over which some scientists make merry. If, however, this which is called science, in all its various and successive forms of expression, has for its uniform purpose the opposition and destruction of the Christian religion as revealed in the Scriptures, then its various moods are intelligible. If modern thinkers affirm that there is but one substance in the universe, and that all phenomena can be explained in terms of atoms and force, or in place of force some substitute spirit, not defining spirit as person, then modern thinkers have added nothing to the doctrines of Democritus and Epicurus. When modern rationalism is largely the recurrence of what was taught by Lucretius in his "De Rerum Natura," and "natural selection" is substantially the same in Lucretius as in Darwin, why should the science of the nineteenth century boast of progress, while it is only an echo of the first century? Thus, there is a sort of progress which is evidently not in a right line, but in a circle, which involves the repetition of the old under the signature of the new, at the same time hypocritically and superciliously denouncing the permanent doctrines of Christianity founded in the Scriptures as "antiquated," and therefore of no worth.

The advocates of the new theology claim that evolution, as they hold it, is the result of the Divine immanence in man, which is not, it must be observed, the immanence of God as expressed in His omnipresence, but that pantheistic immanence in which it is held that in being there are aspects in which God and man are identical, as that "human reason is a beam of the Divine reason" or "that the finite spirit is identical, within the limits of its range, with the infinite spirit." * The evolution of thought, culture, and improvement in culture and civilization proceeds from this immanence of "God within" man. When the charge is brought against this view as being pantheistic, its advocates repel the charge by saying that it does not hold, because they admit the Divine transcendence, and that no one who admits this can properly be called a pantheist. But in reply to this defence it must be said that though no one can intelligently affirm the transcendence of God and at the same time hold that technical form of pantheism which makes the world the existence form of God, his *whole* intelligence, power, and life; yet one may be a monist, affirming that there is but one being in the universe; that everything is a *form* of God and all life the life of God; which is pantheism so far as the created universe is concerned,† and is the doctrine to which Tolland first gave the name of pantheism.‡ So also, it is no answer to the charge of pantheism to say that it is "a nightmare which affects some people," or "a terminological bugbear," § or by presuming to avoid the charge by advocating pantheism under the title of monism or "anthropocosmic theism," for this is a measure, however brave in assumption, which must be put to the credit of its author as disingenuous.

* Schurman, p. 227.

† Hodge's Theol., vol. I., p. 78.

‡ Johnson's Cyc.

§ Schurman, p. 174.