

hostilities in 1755, was very different from that of England: his Majesty pacified his neighbours, restrained his Allies, refused the advantageous prospect of a war, which was proposed to him on the continent, and gave all the Powers to understand, that his sole ambition was to restrain his enemies, the English, within due limits, and to maintain peace and justice among the Powers, who ought to regard the differences respecting America with the most impartial neutrality.

The Court of London, to accomplish their ends, took advantage of his Majesty's equitable and pacific conduct. She knew that one of the allies of France might prove a lively obstacle to the establishment of peace and tranquillity, and made no doubt, but, in securing that ally, she should be able to make that house, which was considered as the ancient rival of France, enter into all her views: but the Empress-Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, animated by the same principles of equity of which his Majesty gave such laudable proofs, refused the proposals of England, and rather chose to run the risk of an unjust war, which was the natural and foreseen consequence of the treaty signed at Whitehall between the Kings of England and Prussia, than to engage in one contrary to the good faith of her Imperial Majesty.

His Majesty and the Empress-Queen, previous to the King of Prussia's invasion of Saxony, entered into an alliance on the 1st of May 1756, which was purely defensive. Their Majesties hoped, that their alliance would check the fire which was ready to kindle in Germany, and that it would prevent a war on the continent of Europe. They were deceived in their expectations: the Court of London had armed the King of Prussia; nothing could restrain a Prince whose passion for war was unhappily violent: and he began it at the end of the year 1756, by the invasion of Saxony, and the attack of Bohemia.

From that time two distinct wars subsisted; one, of
France