

Mr. TAYLOR: I am quite convinced that the prime issues involved, the prime motives and the debate is over domestic considerations. I think there is some evidence that foreign policy has played a part and still is playing a part, but there is no evidence to suggest that foreign policy has been predominant at any point.

Mr. WALKER: I am sure you have had discussions with Western diplomats. I do not know whether you have had any with the U.S. State Department or our own external affairs people. But in your discussions do they accept your judgment on the posture or do you feel that the West, in fact, is uninformed about this particular subject?

Mr. TAYLOR: I do not think the West is uninformed either in terms of our foreign service or in terms of our academic communities or parliaments as they choose to make themselves informed. I think there is still a great deal of confusion, and I cannot just speak for the predominant view in either the External Affairs or the State departments, but certainly the predominant view of everything I have read by the leading American Sinologists is on the domestic issues involved.

Mr. WALKER: Would you say that for us, the West,—I will put quotations around these words—"in our own selfish interest" Mao's presence at the moment serves us very well rather than having more modern, more progressive elements, if you will, in control of China who are forging a great industrial nation? I take it that Mao, in fact, rather than being a revolutionary is a reactionary who is attempting to revive something that is dead and gone. The progressive elements are being held under. Is it in our interest that Mao gives us more breathing space by his presence there?

Mr. TAYLOR: That could be argued in the short run. I do not think so. I would not really support that I think because in the long run, or even in the middling run of a decade or of 15 or 20 years, inevitably it will be in our interests and it will happen that a more sophisticated political and governmental structure will evolve in China. It still will be a Communist one but we will see something parallel to what has happened in the Soviet Union although not a direct parallel. Certainly, Chinese foreign policy may not be affected immediately by what happens inside China but there will be the growth of Revisionism, I feel. This is a western viewpoint, and I may be blinkered, but I feel it is virtually inevitable in order for China to evolve the sort of sophisticated technological society that it must have to be a great power. I think that is in our interest because I think this will eventually, not directly but eventually, lead to a different assessment of their foreign relations.

Mr. WALKER: Do the Chinese see the U.S. as an ideological or military threat? What is their fear? Is it the exposing of their people to the West? Do they fear the way Russia has, modernized, if you will, their ideology because of exposure to the West? Is this what Mao is afraid of for the Chinese people? Is it the ideological presence of the United States and the ideas of the modern world that may seep in, or is it a real fear of military might?

Mr. TAYLOR: I think it is both and I would hesitate to say which is the more predominant in Mao's mind. They would stress the ideological element in what