

and realistic approach that allows Canada to balance our security needs and obligations with our traditional disarmament goals.

Following the ICJ advisory opinion, via the Departmental website, Mr. Axworthy invited comments from the Canadians on general arms control and disarmament issues. He asked a series of questions which I think are worth repeating here:

1. What are your views of the implications of the opinions given by the ICJ on global efforts toward nuclear non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament?

2. What are your views on Canada's current approach of pursuing initiatives aimed at preventing proliferation, eliminating nuclear testing, cutting production of fissile materials and then focussing on comprehensive multilateral nuclear disarmament?

3. The President of the Court stated that "the question of nuclear weapons is a very important one. It unfortunately turned out to be a field where the Court had to find that there is no immediately clear answer to the question put to it. We must hope that the international community...will undertake as quickly as possible to correct the imperfections of international law, which, after all, is nothing more than the creation of States themselves." How do you believe Canada should proceed?

And so, I would like to offer for your consideration some additional critical questions we face as we attempt to adapt from Cold War to common security.

Canada has always recognized that it is only among the 5 Nuclear Weapons States that nuclear reductions can be negotiated. This reality will not change. But is there a role for multilateral "discussion" of the global dimension of the nuclear question. The Nuclear Weapons States do not believe there is. Many disagree. But what is the value-added that multilateral discussions including non-nuclear countries can make to this issue?

Canada will continue to encourage and support the USA and Russia to further reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals beyond the START II levels. But in doing so, is it prudent or realistic to insist, as some non-aligned countries have done, that we impose deadlines, timetables or otherwise dictate the pace of negotiations?

Canada continues to believe that you cannot negotiate nuclear disarmament in a vacuum. Disarmament fits into a broader set of interlocking security relationships. Many of those countries which most vigorously advocate timetables at the level of rhetoric are not prepared to meet those deadlines in practice. For example, it is worth asking the question: Would India agree to give up its nuclear option according to some arbitrary deadline even if its security concerns with Pakistan and China were unresolved?

Timetables may be useful when interested parties already have an agreed set of assumptions on the problem, the objective and how to tackle it. For most part, this was the case for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. However, in the absence of this fundamental common ground, timetables are unlikely to be effective.

If nuclear weapons are not meant to be used, is it prudent to attempt to place nuclear weapons, as one expert has recommended "within a slowly contracting net" of restrictions (e.g. an improved non-proliferation regime, a CTBT and Cut-off convention, additional nuclear weapons free zones and security assurances) as well as negotiated reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons?

Nuclear deterrence continues to be a necessary component of collective defence. However, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons is surely excessive. What is the level of reductions and restrictions of nuclear weapons that would be commensurate with our current and future security needs?

To what extent should we be encouraging the NWS to reduce not only the number of their nuclear weapons, but also their delivery systems, readiness and deployment?

How can we get the other states - such as India - which we know are keeping open the nuclear weapons option, to follow the example of countries like Ukraine and South Africa and sign the NPT renouncing forever these weapons?

How can Canada provide practical support to extremely costly and technically complex nuclear disarmament efforts, for example, by the proposed project to burn weapons grade fissile material in CANDU reactors?

One thing is certain: there is a need for a "new diplomacy" on nuclear disarmament issues. This new diplomacy was best demonstrated during the NPT Extension process when the concerted effort led by Canada to reach out beyond the traditional North-South ideological blocs to talk candidly to countries about their real long term security interests was instrumental in securing permanently this treaty. This effort to engage, however, must not be seen as a 'one-off' exercise, there must be consistency and sustained commitment if it is to be effective.

Canada is unusually — uniquely — well placed to reach out to non-traditional partners. The links we have spent years building — whether in the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, the Organization of American States, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Middle East Peace Process, or in the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe — equip us in building consensus, by using existing groups or creating new communities of common interest to build a new type of international security system.

As we move forward, Canada will continue to engage non-traditional partners and be prepared to acknowledge and support constructive proposals regardless of their origin. This much can and must be done.

The recent conclusion of the CTBT has laid a cornerstone on which we can build steadily toward our goal of nuclear disarmament. There are exciting possibilities for Canada and others to pursue. With the CTBT we have truly moved beyond the rhetoric in our disarmament work. But there are still many complex challenges