

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Chapter 2** - Substantial Rwandan early warning intelligence existed for years, and peaked during 1993 and early 1994. UN mechanisms particularly, failed to effectively channel sufficient intelligence to prod relevant national and UN decision makers. What was needed was overwhelming intelligence, presented in clear and certain terms, so as to override the general perception of yet "another civil war in Africa". Nevertheless, the warnings were undeniably there, and the largest failure was on the part of national and UN leaders who hoped the issue would just resolve itself. A rapid, limited, peacekeeping deployment within a week of April 6th was not only eminently possible, but would have substantially reduced both massacres and refugee flows. The undeniable, albeit narrow, success of Operation Turquoise supports this conclusion.

**Chapter 3** - The conflict resolution and peacekeeping response in the months immediately after April 6th was a failure. The fundamental and continuing lack of political will by almost every UN member was most evident in the Security Council. This general lack of will, exacerbated by widely different national agendas, even resulted in an initial denial of genocide despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Many countries used the crisis to establish positions on issues (eg. peacekeeping, the role of the Security Council) that had little to do with the Rwandan crisis. The rapid withdrawal of most of UNAMIR once foreign nationals were withdrawn was followed by a glacial and half hearted reinforcement of UNAMIR. Consensus is that at best UNAMIR did little for Rwandans during this period, and at worse, increased the hardline Hutu perception of world indifference to them orchestrating massacres and refugee flows. The problem this time was not the UN structure or staff, but its member states.

**Chapter 4** - The humanitarian response on the other hand was fast and relatively well orchestrated amongst both UN agencies and with nongovernmental humanitarian organizations. There were some real successes and just as promisingly, many in the humanitarian community are actively identifying and setting about to correct the failures. The present confusion on how to address the humanitarian dilemmas of the refugee camps in Zaire, and Rwandan reconstruction, does not detract from those initial successes.