

could be the ultimate guarantor for the security of the DPRK in the uncertain future; (2) nuclear weapons could serve as a hedge against possible ROK/US military retaliation for some future the DPRK's military adventurism; (3) the DPRK could enjoy greater freedom of military provocation and terrorism; (4) the DPRK would hardly abandon voluntarily the program unless they be forced due to its long-term and heavy investment.

- Very recently this year, Russia's External Intelligence Service released a report, in which the former KGB disclosed that the DPRK is developing nuclear weapons. This is the very first time that the DPRK's nuclear weapons program was made public by an intelligence organization of Russia, which has a long-standing military pact with Pyongyang. According to the Russian expose, Pyongyang is now standing on the threshold of developing nuclear bombs, in which experts of the DPRK's Army are directly participating.

- If the DPRK should successfully develop nuclear weapons, then (1) the possibility of arms control will virtually vanish; (2) The military tension on the Korean peninsula will be greatly heightened; (3) the regional stability in Northeast Asia will be seriously in danger.

- Regarding the DPRK's nuclear issue, General RisCassi, current commander of the USFK, said by reflecting Washington's view that even if North Korea succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, South Korea would be protected by the US nuclear umbrella under the ROK-US mutual defense treaty. Commenting on possible military strikes against North Korean nuclear facilities, the general said it might be a problem as the action could escalate into a larger military confrontation. He said it is more important for the US to make diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and support nuclear negotiations between the two Koreas. Seoul's position on the nuclear issue is basically the same as the Washington's view.

- Then, we should raise a question: what if all the diplomatic efforts fail? A possible course of action by the international agencies is that (1) IAEA decides to invoke a special inspection of the DPRK's nuclear facilities; (2) IAEA sends a message to Pyongyang in the name of IAEA Director General; (3) if no response from the DPRK, IAEA makes one more request with a deadline; (4) if the DPRK still refuses to accept a special inspection or fails to respond to its request, IAEA brings the issue to the UNSC.

- However, it is doubtful whether the UNSC can decide on measures to put pressure on North Korea: (1) it is unlikely that all UNSC members will act together, as they did in dealing with the Iraq case; (2) China is not expected to willingly join the other powers in imposing any form of