

virtually imposed upon them. This is not currently the situation in Europe where the countries of East and West share a "cold peace" and have no urgent need for third-party assistance.⁵⁵

Second, the US was able to offer the parties a level of resources and verification expertise that neither could hope to match. Thus Egypt and Israel were clearly dependent on an extra-regional third party. In the European context, however, where the superpowers would be principal parties to any agreement, it is likely that participants would collectively possess the technical expertise and financial resources necessary for verification and would not, therefore, require or desire extra-regional assistance. There would be little inclination to accept a verification regime "imposed" by a third party as was the case in Sinai.

Finally, whereas the UN — in conjunction with the US — played an important third-party role in verifying compliance with the Sinai II Agreement, it is unlikely that members of either European alliance would find the UN a credible alternative, even within a limited geographic area, to self-sufficiency. In addition, fear of politicization of sensitive security issues by the UN would further militate against reliance on a supervisory force that could not act quickly, discretely and decisively to resolve disputes.

Bearing in mind these important qualifications, it is possible to envisage European parties to a multilateral agreement consenting to some kind of third-party verification, perhaps a regional grouping composed of all or some signatories to the agreement. It is also conceivable that a verification commission composed of the neutral and non-aligned nations might be acceptable to the parties. The success of a multilateral verification system could well depend on the very process by which membership in such a system is negotiated.

⁵⁵ For analytical and practical purposes, it is best to divide third-party roles into those required for stabilizing conflict-prone situations (i.e., extra-regional actors facilitating a settlement between local adversaries) and those that would constitute a natural outgrowth from a negotiation process among states with no urgent need for conflict settlement. Different types of third parties may be necessary to fit the requirements of each situation.

e) *Designing Effective Verification Procedures for Central Europe*

It is important to note that the Stockholm Document already provides some of the elements that could serve to buttress the verification measures discussed above. For example, the participating states have agreed to give prior notice and allow observation of certain military activities and to employ national technical means (NTM) in monitoring compliance with agreed confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs).⁵⁶ Of particular relevance to the disengagement and verification scheme discussed here are the verification provisions of the Stockholm Document that allow participating states to conduct on-site and aerial inspections within the zone of application.⁵⁷ In addition, the establishment of reporting and communication procedures associated with verifying the agreed CSBMs could clearly be integrated into the inspection, reporting and consultation mechanisms associated with the operation of a demilitarized buffer zone and early warning watch stations in the Fulda Gap/Intra-German border area.

⁵⁶ The Document of the Stockholm Conference of September 19, 1986 states that: "The participating states recognize that national technical means can play a role in monitoring compliance with agreed confidence- and security-building measures", Paragraph 64.

⁵⁷ Regarding on-site inspection, the Document of the Stockholm Conference of September 19, 1986 states: "In accordance with the provisions contained in this document each participating state has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating state within the zone of application for CSBMs", Paragraph 65. In terms of the aerial regime, the Stockholm Document states: "Aircraft will be chosen which provide the inspection team with a continuous view of the ground during the inspection", Paragraph 89.

