

nant escaped in the darkness to Port Arthur.

No serious attempt was made by the Japanese to prevent the disembarkation of the 7,000 Chinese troops at the Yalu. They had served their purpose as a decoy for the fleet, and would probably be soon incapacitated from offensive power by disorganisation and starvation.

We will now leave the 1st Japanese Army for the present, advancing from Ping-Yang towards the Yalu, and direct our attention to the second part of the Japanese strategical scheme. It is obvious that if an insular power like Japan is to invade a neighbor on the main land, it is first absolutely necessary to secure "command in the sea;" in other words, to destroy or disable the enemy's fleet. Until this object is effected the invading power cannot transport its armies in safety across the sea, or supply them with certainty from the mother country, nor is the line of retreat, in case of a reverse, secure.

In this respect England and Japan are in an almost precisely similar situation, and it is only her command of the sea which gives the voice of England its great weight in the councils of Europe.

This fundamental truth was most thoroughly grasped by the Japanese, who knew that before they could gratify their national ambition of invading China, they must complete the destruction or capture of the Chinese fleet. They had done a good deal in this direction at the battle of the Yalu, but the main portion of the Chinese navy still remained to block the otherwise open road to Tientsin and Peking. As before stated, the Chinese fleet, after the Yalu battle, retreated to Port Arthur for security.

This was the principal naval station of the Chinese Empire, and enormous sums had been spent in equipping and defending it. The defences were planned by French engineers, and their construction occupied the period 1887-1890.

It contained a magnificent dockyard and arsenal, and enormous stores of coal and munitions of war. Its naturally strong position was so enhanced by the most modern forts and guns, torpedo, flotilla and mines, that European experts pronounced it impregnable. And so it might have been, if garrisoned by anything approaching efficient troops; but a Chinese garrison is only a little worse than no garrison at all.

At Port Arthur the Chinese fleet was refitting in security, under the guns of the forts, and could not be enticed out. Therefore the next Japanese move was obviously to capture Port Arthur and, if possible, the Chinese fleet within it. Further, if successful, the possession of this secure harbor and dockyard would be of immense assistance to the Japanese in their advance on Peking, giving them a new base of operations at the very entrance of the Gulf of Pechili.

Let us see how this project was carried out. The 2nd Japanese army, consisting of the 1st Division, under General Yamaji, and 2nd Division, under General Sakuma, with a siege train, (25,000 men in all,) with Marshall Oyama in chief command, was mobilized at Hiroshima, and was conveyed in 38 transports, escorted by 25 warships, to the Liau-Tong peninsula. A landing was effected at Kwaenko to the north of Talienswan, at the end of October.

It is almost incredible that this landing was totally unopposed, in view of the fact that the Chinese fleet was within 60 miles, and the flower of the Chinese army was concentrated around Port Arthur and Talienswan; but such was the case.

You will observe that the Japanese chose their landing place so as to seize

the narrowest neck of the peninsula, and having completed their arrangements for the advance, they marched southwards along the peninsula, and on Nov. 6th they captured, without much difficulty, Kinchow and the forts at Talienswan, thus isolating the whole Chinese army round Port Arthur. There was a Chinese force, however, at Fu-chow, on the line of the proposed railway between New-chwang and Port Arthur, and this being a menace to the Japanese rear, a brigade, under General Nogi, was despatched from Kin-chow to attack them. Gen. Nogi landed at Fu-chow bay, and drove the Chinese before him, northward. He then continued to advance up the peninsula to cover the rear of the 2nd army, and, if possible, to open communications with the 1st army in Manchuria.

Meanwhile the 2nd army was closing slowly, but relentlessly, on Port Arthur by land, whilst the fleet watched it by sea. The Japanese arrived opposite the outer defences on Nov. 20th.

Mr. Villiers has given us a graphic description of this advance and the pictorial side of the subsequent fighting, so I will only give a brief resumé of the method of attack.

On Nov. 20th the outlying defences, feebly defended, fell into the hands of the Japanese. On the 21st the land forts, bombarded by the Japanese artillery and ships, were captured by the Infantry, which advanced in three columns, and with the perfect order and coolness of troops on parade. By 10 o'clock the land forts and the town were in possession of the Japanese, and some hours afterwards the sea-front forts were also evacuated by the Chinese, almost without resistance.

In these operations the Japanese fleet took a prominent part, especially the torpedo boats, which kept dashing into the harbour and drawing the fire of the coast forts.

The Japanese, not wishing to be encumbered with Chinese prisoners, purposely left the road open for them to escape by into the country.

The losses sustained were about 1,500 on the Chinese side and 200 on the Japanese.

Everything fell into the hands of the victors intact; dockyards, arsenals, stores, forts and ammunition. To the disappointment of the Japanese, however, they discovered that their chief objective, the Chinese fleet, had previously escaped from Port Arthur, and had taken refuge at Wei-Hai-Wei, the other great naval station at the opposite side of the Gulf.

*To be continued.*

## League Badges.

The Editor CANADIAN MILITARY GAZETTE.

When the Military Rifle League was in its infancy, Secretary Pringle was instrumental in obtaining some recognition of its badges by the militia authorities, who issued an order on the subject. Will you kindly print the substance of the order, to settle a dispute as to whether or not the badges may be worn by a soldier on parade.

PIONEER.

Militia General Orders of 24th March, 1892, paragraph 5, says: "The badges given by the Canadian Military Rifle League, may be worn by militiamen in uniform, on the left arm, under similar regulations to those which apply to the wearing by militiamen of badges given by the National Rifle Association of England, and the Dominion Rifle Association of Canada."

## THE CREMEA IN 1854 & 1894

[Continued.]

I had scarcely left it before it was swept by case-shot from three guns in succession, and many of the men who had just been running over their wounded comrades fell, killed or wounded, over them. As I approached our third parallel the last of the reserve, which had remained out to cover the retreat when the "retire" was sounded, were going in.

I was making for a place in the third parallel, where the parapet had been worn down by men running over it, in order to avoid the exertion of going up even four feet, when a young soldier passed me on my left side, and, doubtless, not noticing I was wounded, knocked my arm heavily, saying, "Move on, sir, please." As he passed over the parapet with his rifle at the trail, I caught it by the small of the butt to pull myself up. He turned round angrily, asking "What are you doing?" and while his face was bent on mine, a round shot, passing my ear, struck him full between the shoulders, and I stepped over his body, so exhausted as to be strangely indifferent to my own life, saved by the soldier having jostled me out of my turn at the gap.

On the far side of this parapet there sat a sailor, who had been severely wounded in his right hand, having lost two of his fingers. Feeling how very helpless I had become, I could not but admire the man's coolness and self-possession. He was unable to use his right hand, but with the left he had pulled out of his trousers the tail of his shirt, and holding it in his teeth, had already torn off two or three strips when I passed him. With these he was bandaging up his hand in a manner which would have done credit to any of our ambulance classes of the present day, and he answered me quite cheerily as to the nature of the wound, on which I addressed him.

I had come to the end of my strength, and was unable to mount the parapet of the 8-gun battery, falling down in the attempt. Two officers came out and carried me in, offering me brandy and water. A friendly doctor, whom I had known for some time, greeted me warmly with "Sit down, me dear boy, an' I'll have your arm off before ye know where ye are." I had some difficulty in evading his kind attentions, but eventually being put into a stretcher, I was carried away by four blue-jackets, a shipmate midshipman, Mr. Peard, who had recently joined the brigade, walking alongside. We met the commander of the Naval Brigade, Captain Lushington, when I was being carried away, and to my great relief he informed me that Captain Peel was alive.

Before we left the battery, the four men carrying me had a narrow escape, for a shell bursting just short of us, ploughed up the ground between the fore and hind carriers. This was the last of my escapes from the enemy, but as we passed through the camp of the 4th Division, the men, in changing arms, managed to drop me out of the stretcher. It was one of those made to roll up, and by an iron stay; this came unshipped as the men changed shoulders, and I fell heavily on the wounded arm!

While awaiting in the operating tent, with painful anxiety, my turn for the table, I was interested by the extraordinary fortitude of a blue-jacket, who discussed the morning's work without a break in his voice while the doctors were removing two of his fingers at the third joints. I had a prolonged argument ere