

## FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

## FRANCE.

The Paris correspondent of the *Daily News* says that the Privy Council held a meeting on Thursday, 21st September, at which it is understood a proposal from General Goyon, to augment the French Army at Rome to 20,000, and some say to put down Garibaldi, was discussed. It is feared the result was a decision which will lead to a bloody war, and at best put an end for a long time to all hope of regenerating Italy.

Marshal Vialant leaves Paris to take the command of the Army of Italy, and will probably be followed by two divisions.

PARIS, SEPT. 21.—M. Alphonse Esquiros, the author of various articles on England and English life which have appeared in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* in the course of the last three years, commences in the last number of that periodical a series of papers on our military institutions, the army and the volunteers, the military schools and arsenals. The first instalment of the series dwells at very considerable length on the arsenals and schools, and especially on Woolwich and its works. It is written with vivacity and spirit, and with an evident desire to be impartial and just towards England, where it will be read with interest, especially by military men. The following are the opening paragraphs:—

"The idea has been too lightly spread that Great Britain is not a military nation; the movement that has taken place during the last year in the United Kingdom sufficiently confutes this opinion, which at a given moment may become dangerous for the other States of Europe. On what, besides, is based the assertion that England is only a naval power of the first class? Have not the English soldiers, although never numerous, sufficed for all the great eventualities of history? Has not the weight of their arms been felt for centuries past in the balance in which are weighed the destinies of the Continent? Each time that it was necessary to conquer have they not conquered? I will not awaken irritating recollection, I will not write the name of a great battle so painful to our national self-love; it suffices to recall the fact that lately England, with a handful of men, reconquered India. Instead of denying history, it were better to seek by what ties the British character is linked to the group of martial nations. The Englishman is not warlike from taste; he does not love war for war's sake, or maintain an army for the ruinous pleasure of seeing bayonets glitter and banners flaunt. He has an army to defend his territory, his commerce, the immense network of his external relations and affairs. Experience has more than once shown him the necessity of putting the pride of riches under the protection of courage. The English soldier has less enthusiasm than coolness. On a battlefield he dies as he lives, with resolution and from a sentiment of duty.—Immortal in his ranks (*inévitable*) he feels that the responsibility of the labor which has made England an opulent nation rests upon his arms. The military element presents, then, in Great Britain, peculiar and interesting traits. And then quite lately, besides the regular army, a new independent army has arisen. Yesterday it existed but as a project, to-day it fills the towns with the noise of its clarions, passes reviews in Hyde Park and at Holyrood, and covers the plain with the smoke of its skirmishers. I speak of the Volunteers, or Rifle-men. We must investigate the origin of this movement, and the influence it has already exercised on English habits; but, before busying ourselves with the army and the Volunteers, it will be well to study the military schools and arsenals. At a period when all the nations of Europe observe one another, and when, each moment, rumors of war arise, the away, and then again are heard, it is not useless to France to know the strength of her neighbors."

The *Opinion Nationale* publishes a rather curious letter from a French friend now in England. It is chiefly about the Volunteers and the present feeling in England towards France. Its tone is rather friendly than otherwise; it contains some truths and some of those blunders which even an intelligent foreigner may fall into who has not been long in England.

"At last," the letter commences, "I have seen them, those English Volunteers, who almost dispute the palm with those of Garibaldi. They are of all colors—gray, black, blue, and many another tint. They look well under arms; we will even say, to show how far our impartiality goes, that they have a martial bearing which reminds one of our National Guards of 1830. They exercise themselves in the management of arms with all the seriousness and application which distinguish the British character; this is equivalent to saying that they will certainly make rapid progress in that exercise."—*Times Cor.*

Whether sorrow for the misfortunes which are weighing down the heart of the Holy Father and of all his children, or indignation for the hypocrisy and wickedness of those who are destroying his throne ought to prevail, is a question which we need not stay to discuss. The present scene is only the last of a drama which was long ago settled at Turin and Paris. The Pope, it was well known, was materially in the hands of the Emperor Napoleon. The Emperor, then, might well prophesy what would become of the Papal power, for he might (for the time) reduce it to any dimensions that he pleased. He put forth his programme, and has taken good care that all the measures which the Papal Government inaugurated to prevent its consummation should fail. First, the Pope was wrong, because he had no army, and therefore no means of guaranteeing the suppression of crime, and the maintenance of order. He collected the nucleus of an army, and confided its organization to a noble warrior; and he was still more wrong, because the invasion and annexation of his States was every day becoming more difficult. One day intervention was right, and France was loudly cheered when she took Milan from Austria; the next day intervention was positively wrong. France had no right to secure Modena, Florence, or the Romagna to those princes to whom she promised a safe return in the preliminaries of Villafranca, and Europe, which had

cheered the invasion of Lombardy, was much scandalized at the French occupation of Rome. One day the question of nationalities was the pivot on which European policy was to turn, and by it Austria was adjudged to lose Lombardy, Hungary, and her Slavonian provinces; but in Italy the Pope and the King of Naples, the most absolutely national of any dynasties in the Peninsula, had by the same rule to give way to the House of Savoy, which is scarcely Italian at all. In the matter of political administration, the strictest centralization was necessary for Italy, and all thrones which prevented it were to fall. In Austria or in Russia this centralization is the bugbear of revolutionists, and will be erected into a cause for attacking them. No wonder that in the midst of these contradictions the Pope is tired of French protection, has sent his ultimatum to the French Government, and, it is said, has even threatened to leave Rome. The head of Christendom is too august a power to be made the mere plaything of a set of diplomatic liars, and to be satisfied with the hypocritical condolences of the false friend who administers the poison while he sits by the bedside in the nurse's chair, and his tender affection takes care that no more faithful attendant should usurp the place that belongs of right to the eldest son of the Church. The annals of English crime present many an example of exemplary husbands thus poisoning their wives, and the difficulty of bringing home the crime to them is so great that unfortunately they generally go unpunished. The policy of the revolution has taken a lesson from our criminal courts, and with eminent success. But there can be no reason why the Church should any longer submit to such treatment. The Holy Father may wander forth, like Abraham, the father of the faithful, not knowing whither he goes; but, wherever he places his foot, he will be received with reverence, and Italy, which even now is beginning to heave with reactionary movements, will recall his successors to their rightful throne. Perhaps the Holy Father would best consult his own dignity if he were to do that which the *Constitutionnel* counsels him so earnestly not to do—to leave Rome for the moment to Victor Emmanuel, to Garibaldi, and to Napoleon III.—*Weekly Register.*

*L'ami de la Religion* announces the discovery, in an old hair-bottomed arm-chair used by Pope Pius VII. when a prisoner at Fontainebleau, of the two following documents, which possess more than ordinary interest under existing circumstances. The first is a letter addressed to the Pope by the Emperor Napoleon I., and is dated "Fontainebleau, January 25, 1813." The second is a letter written to the Pope when in confinement at Savona, by Count Bigot, announcing to His Holiness that, in consequence of an English plan to land on the coast and carry off His Holiness, the Emperor Napoleon had determined to remove him to Fontainebleau. The letter from Napoleon is in the following terms:—

"Very Holy Father,—Your Holiness having appeared to me to fear, at the moment of signing the articles putting an end to the divisions which afflict the Church, that they might bear the interpretation of an implied renunciation of your pretension to the Roman States, I feel pleasure in assuring you that never having intended to demand of you a renunciation of the temporal sovereignty of those States, your Holiness need not fear that it may be believed that you renounce your rights or pretensions either directly or indirectly, by signing the above-mentioned articles. It is with the Pope in his quality of Chief of the Church in spiritual affairs that I have treated. In conclusion, very Holy Father, I pray God that He may preserve you for many years to the government of our mother, the Holy Church."

"Your very devoted son,"  
"Fontainebleau, Jan. 25, 1813." "NAPOLEON."  
The following is the letter of Count Bigot de Preaumeu, Minister of Public Worship under Napoleon I.:—

"Paris, May 27, 1812."  
"Very Holy Father,—The well-known plan of the English to make a descent in the neighborhood of Savona to carry you off compels the French Government to bring your Holiness to the capital. Orders have consequently been given that your Holiness may first come to Fontainebleau, where you will occupy the lodgings you formerly inhabited, and where you will see the bishops and those of the cardinals who are in France. Your Holiness is not to remain at Fontainebleau longer than is required to fit up the apartments in the Archbishop's Palace in Paris, which you will then inhabit."

"I am, with profound respect, very Holy Father, your Holiness's very humble and very obedient servant."

The French Government is evidently displeased with the Northern Powers, for it seems that the diplomatic representatives of France at Vienna and Berlin, who are now at Paris on leave of absence are not to be allowed to return to their posts until after the interview at Warsaw.—*Weekly Register.*

A letter from Boulogne-sur-Mer announces the arrest in that town of an Englishman named Templeman, alias Herbert, alias Smith, and the female who lived with him, on suspicion of being concerned in the robbery perpetrated at the cathedral of Notre Dame, in Paris.

GENERAL PIMODAN.—An attempt has been made by the *Constitutionnel* to lessen the sympathy felt in Florence for those French officers who fought in the unequal contest at Castel-Fidardo, by asserting that General Pimodan had fought against his countrymen at Solferino. The Paris correspondent of the *Times* thus disposes of the statement:—

A journal that affects to be so guarded in its statements and so jealous of the truth, and which displays so much virtuous indignation when charges are brought against its friends, might be expected to be rather more cautious in accusing other people. Its assertion concerning M. de Pimodan has drawn upon it an indignant contradiction from several papers, the *Paris* taking the lead. *Et tu Brute!* The offending journal this morning eats the lead—not in time, however, to save it from some rough handling by its contemporaries. *L'ami de la Religion* declares the assertion to be "a monstrous levity or an abominable imposture." The Marquis de Pimodan served in the campaigns of 1848-9, in Italy and Hungary, but he had left the Austrian service, and had come to reside in France before the war of 1859. He had never forfeited the character of a Frenchman. When serving in Hungary he was taken prisoner by the Hungarians, and narrowly escaped being shot. His family is a very old one, and he is allied by marriage with the Montmorencys.

ITALY.  
It is clear to the blindest eyes that Victor Emmanuel would never have dared to violate the neutrality of the States of the Church without a previous assurance of the benevolent neutrality of his powerful ally. The recall of Baron de Tallyrand, the return, without any fresh instructions, of General de Goyon are merely a precaution to keep things quiet in France while the orders given to the French garrison at Rome only to defend the City and the Patrimony of the Pope are simply a diplomatic permission for the revolution to press forward the completion of the infernal programme of *le Pape et le Congrès*. We may possibly now see something done for the Pope in order to set Catholic scruples at rest

and you will certainly see the Emperor abandon himself to the English alliance, to try to balance the coalition of the Northern Powers, which is no longer concealed. But the later you break with him, the deeper will be your regrets for not having broken with him before. Anybody who can understand must see that the silence of the *Moniteur* and the language of the mercenary press are positive proofs of the real connivance of the Cabinet of the Tuilleries with that of Turin. After a few weak words of blame for Piedmont, on whom are Lemayrac, Grandguillot, and the nameless crowd who draw their inspiration from M. Billault's Bureau, now fixing their fangs? In Italy it is against the Pope, in France against the *Ami de la Religion*, which is almost the only paper that has the courage to defend the Pope at the daily risk of suppression. It was nearly stopped because of the article of Viscount Lemerle, and only escaped an action because that gentleman is a deputy. The inquisitorial administration contented itself this time with making the ex-legitimist, E. de la Guéronnière, insert a note in the *Patrie*, a paper which would fain persuade the weaker brethren that the Pope is in no danger; but I don't think that the *Ami de la Religion* has long to live, any more than the *Correspondent*, the present number of which contains a splendid article by the Count de Falloux, where you will find the soundest logic, in union with the most vigorous language, and a damning concatenation of evidence which will put to shame my feeble statement of the case. We are hurrying towards an inevitable crisis, and I do not fear it, for a fever, however hot it is, may be cured; but this chronic weakness, if it goes on, must sooner or later kill us. At this moment you may trust me that the Nuncio of the Holy Father expresses himself in the strongest terms of indignation against the conduct of the French Government.—*Corr. Weekly Register.*

RETIRING FROM BUSINESS.—Talking to a friend the other day about the prospects of Italy, Victor Emmanuel said:—"I know I am playing for a tremendous stake, but *che diavolo*? If I lose my crown, I am sure to get employment as a colonel, somewhere or other." His Majesty forgets that his recognised military rank is that of a corporal, conferred on him by the Zouaves at Palestro. The *Monde* observes that, of all the crowns which he has inherited or usurped, those of "Cyprus and Jerusalem" alone are likely to be left him, as he has nothing to fear from the "popular suffrage" in those localities.

THE FETTER OF ITALY.—A month ago M. Carour said to several persons, all of whom he not kept the secret, "Garibaldi is upsetting us, the democracy is swallowing us up; but, before we are entirely gone, Garibaldi and I will have a trial of strength. Of that, come what may." And when one of his confidants, disturbed at this sally, said to him, "and if it should happen that instead of freeing Italy, she should be enslaved anew?" "Come what may," replied his Excellency; "better Italy enslaved, than Italy democratic!"—*Unita Italiana.*

Even the Paris correspondent of the *Star* admits that the Turin accounts are not reliable. He says:—"The combat of Castel-Fidardo, in spite of every effort to conceal all particulars, and render the result alone public, appears to have been one of the most fearful kind. The proportion of 11,000 men on Lamoriciere's side to the 40,000 Piedmontese drawn up against him, seems alone to have decided the chances in favor of the Sardinian general."

The statement of the *Turin Gazette* that Lamoriciere had fled from the field of battle, and that his troops were disgusted with his conduct has given great offence in Paris, and much embittered the French people and army against the propagators of such lies. The Paris correspondents of several London papers have condemned it, and the correspondent of the *Herald* justly adds that General Lamoriciere's courage is too well established to be affected in any way by this disgraceful calumny. For six hours he assailed the foe in their strong position. Twice his gallant little army came to close quarters with the enemy, bearing them down before them. And a third time they went to the charge, resolved to carry the last position, when, however, the vast numbers opposed to them obliged them to retire; but the gallant general, and a large force, cut their way through, and dashed on to Ancona, after performing prodigies of valor, and leaving 4,000 of the enemy dead and wounded on the bloody and hard fought field. The lying Sardinian despatches state that the Papal army were indignant at his flight, but this is now known to be a falsehood.

BATTLE OF ANCONA.—Details are still wanting, but it is certain that the two armies displayed equal courage, and both experienced severe loss. The Piedmontese lines were firmly established, and the Pontifical troops failed in their attempt to force them. Three times they attacked the positions, and three times were compelled to fall back. It was in the third attack that the General de Pimodan received three wounds, and expired in the night.

In the present exciting state of affairs in Italy there are some traits of character and some proofs of valour worth recording. Among recent items of miscellaneous news, we learn that M. de Bourbon Chabers wrote from Castel-Fidardo, on the eve of the battle,—"We have 45,000 Piedmontese before us; to-morrow we will pass through them, or remain in their midst! At Perugia, the garrison of 1,000 men was attacked by 20,000 Sardinians! Madame de Lamoriciere has received a letter from her husband at Ancona; he was in perfect health. In the battle of Castel-Fidardo, the Franco-Belgians fought desperately: the Swiss teebly; the native Pontifical soldiers turned tail. It is believed that bribery was resorted to by the Sardinian agents, to bring about this result."

It is well put by the *Correspondent* that men of honor have to choose between two heroes:—

The one, a king, head of a Catholic nation, the ally of England, the creature of France, has sent out sixty thousand men to violate a frontier, to crush the most august and the weakest of sovereigns, and to shed the blood of a handful of Irishmen and Frenchmen, whose only crime is having placed their lives at the service of the common Father of the Faithful.

The other, glorious, popular, happy, after a ten years' exile voluntarily undergone for liberty and for honour, has quitted all,—repose, happiness, a recovered country, a beloved family,—to give to the cause of God what remained of his blood, shed for France in a thousand battles; he has yielded to numbers, after an heroic resistance.

Who then, may our contemporary well ask, before God, before history, and before honour, would not, at the hour we speak of, rather be called Lamoriciere than Victor Emmanuel?—*Weekly Register.*

The following telegram gives more ample particulars of the taking of Perugia than those which were telegraphed from Turin on the 5th. The assault was delivered on the 14th inst:—

Perugia has been vanquished after a struggle fearful, bloody and prolonged.

Fanti's corps d'armee, twenty-five thousand strong made the assault on Friday. The city was defended by two thousand five hundred Bavarian Volunteers, and a company of the Irish battalion of St. Patrick.

Fanti commanded the invaders; Colonel Schmidt commanded the patriots.

For hours the Pontifical Volunteers withstood the outnumbering host of foes. Every inch of ground was disputed. The fight was prolonged from street to street.

In vain the defenders were called on to surrender to a superior force. In all the streets they fought furiously. But they were driven back to the citadel pressed by twenty-five thousand assailants.

The Pontifical troops, overpowered, took refuge in the citadel. By evening Colonel Schmidt found he had but about a thousand men, and the enemy were over twenty thousand strong. He accordingly capitulated.

The Irish Company were commanded by Captain Luther and Lieutenant Howley.

THE PAPAL STATES.—The battle of Castel-Fidardo, however disastrous in its consequences, cannot be reckoned a mistake. The Papal army, which was

created in deference to the recommendations of Piedmont and the other Powers, was not intended to act against the regular troops of foreign Powers, with which it would be futile for so small a principality as that of Rome to attempt to contend, and against whose attacks the Pope has hitherto been guaranteed by the law of Europe which secures his neutrality, but solely against the revolutionary propaganda of Italy, which kept alive, in every town the seeds of insurrection and revolt, ready to spring up as soon as the controlling power was removed.—The Papal army was not intended for attack or for defence against foreign enemies, but simply as a remedy for the scandal of foreign intervention, and to be in time a substitute and successor for the French division which secures the peace of the city of Rome. Hence Lamoriciere was only doing his duty when he divided his army into fragments, and cut it up into garrisons sufficient to secure each town in the States of the Church from any internal disturbances or surprise, or even from the external attacks of an organized force such as Garibaldi could bring against him. From any other danger Lamoriciere had full reason to think himself protected by the law of nations, and by whatever remains of honor the principles of the revolution may have left undestroyed in the hearts of Kings and their Ministers.

It was probably the very success of Lamoriciere's preparation for the object that he had in view that decided his enemies in taking their infamously step against him. Nothing can be more clear, from the very beginning of the agitation in Italy to the present day, than that the revolutionists, and notably the Piedmontese party; did not wish for reforms in the Papal Government, but only for its destruction. Their demand for reform was mere hypocrisy; they feared nothing so much as a serious reform, which might allay discontent, and so might render their game more difficult and precarious. This very army was such a reform demanded by Piedmont and the great Powers of Europe, and when modelled upon their plan and according to their advice, furnishing the acknowledged pretext for the Sardinian attack. Lamoriciere was evidently getting too strong for the revolution or for Garibaldi. If his reforms were allowed to proceed, he would have no more feared any revolutionary outbreak, and thus the whole dream of the Italian Unitarians would have been frustrated. This catastrophe was to be prevented by any means however wicked; Carour was not the man to stick at trifles, and he has, therefore, given Europe the example of invading a friendly State without the preliminary of a declaration of war, and has justified beforehand any Power that may hereafter choose to attack Piedmont in a similar way.

Nothing could exceed the astonishment of the portions of Lamoriciere's army that were left in garrison at Pesaro, Fano, Salsoglia, and St. Angelo, when they found themselves confronted, not with a horde of undisciplined revolutionists, but with the solemn phalanxes of a regular army. The surprise was complete, and small blame to the man who was unprepared for so nefarious a breach of the law of honor and of arms. The little garrisons were partly captured by the Piedmontese, were partly enabled to cut their way through, and to join Lamoriciere, who collected as much as he could get together of his scattered army, and hurried away with them on the road to Ancona. But the Piedmontese were too quick for him; they had got between him and the place, and with his poor handful of troops, many of them raw recruits who had not been more than three months under drill, he had to force his way through an army variously estimated at from 25,000 to 30,000 men. He was "coward" enough to attack from five to ten times his own number of troops, all occupying strong positions, and had general enough to succeed in his operation, though from the severe loss he suffered (resulting, it is said, from the desertion of several of his Italian troops in the very beginning of the fight) his success was as bad as a defeat to him. General Pimodan was killed; the brunt of the battle must have fallen on the German, Irish, and French Volunteers, and they must have fought like lions. The Turin telegrams, which during the last war got an evil notoriety for a mendacity which exceeded that of the bulletins of Napoleon I., own to a loss on their side of 4,000 men, a number which we may treble without fear of mistakes. As far as our information extends, the actual loss of Lamoriciere, including the six hundred prisoners, was not more than about 1,000 men on the day of the battle: but the Sardinian telegrams of the next day were able to announce the capitulation, that is the desertion, of several thousand more, probably of the Italian troops of the Pope. The bulk of the Volunteers probably succeeded in cutting their way through to Ancona. The "flight" of Lamoriciere to that place could not have been so hasty as the Turin telegrams announce, seeing that he had his headquarters outside Ancona when he wrote off to the wife of General Pimodan an account of the fate of her husband.—*Weekly Register.*

THE LIBELS UPON THE IRISH TROOPS.—The following letter from Sir George Bower, dated September 21st, appears in the *Times* of 25th Sept:—

Sir,—With reference to your leading article on the surrender of a portion of the Irish troops at Spoleto, it is but justice to state that those 600 men were cut off from the rest of the Papal army, and that they surrendered to 25,000 Sardinian troops under General Fanti. Surely there can be no disgrace in surrendering before such overwhelming numbers; and an obstinate resistance would have been folly, especially as it could lead to no military result.

I must add that no one could suppose that General Lamoriciere, with a force under 30,000 men, most of them raw recruits, could successfully resist 50,000 Sardinian regular troops. But such a gross outrage as the Sardinian invasion could perhaps scarcely be anticipated, even in these days of piracy and revolution. If General Lamoriciere had had fair play, he would have defended the Papal States; but, placed between Garibaldi and a Sardinian army of 50,000 men, no generalship and no bravery could be of any avail.

I cannot conclude without entering my protest against the term "mercenary" applied to the Irish troops of His Holiness. A mercenary is a man who serves for pay and plunder; but those men enlisted to fight for a sacred principle, to defend the Head of the Church and the Vicar of Christ against the assaults of his enemies, if you call them mercenaries, why do you not apply the same term to the Englishmen, Poles, Hungarians, &c., who have joined Garibaldi? Yet the brave Irishmen are called mercenaries, while Garibaldi's foreigners are applauded as heroes. I protest against this as unfair and unjust.

Your obedient Servant,

Temple, Sept. 21. GEORGE BOWER.

SHALL THE POPE LEAVE ROME.—In this great and terrible crisis, the midst of which we have not yet passed through, it cannot be concealed that the actual state of things compels us to keep our looks solely fixed on Rome. If the moral world, if society still holds by something, it is at that point alone, less threatened, alas! by the treacherous arms of the wretched Sardinian gladiator than by a universal anti-Christian conspiracy. The anchor is bare; never was it more visible that the vessel of society rests entirely on that mysterious anchor. We feel it well. It is the faith of Christians; could they doubt of it, they would be warned sufficiently by the rage of the destroyers, confessing that they have done nothing so long as the Pontifical power, even though like a reed, is still standing.

There is no good annexation—read—there is no thorough revolution, until it is proclaimed from the top of the Quirinal! Garibaldi has declared it. He knows well what he says: his infernal genius does not deceive him. Be sure of that.

It is this that fills us at once with terror and grief, when we consider that his final destiny hangs by a thread. Pius IX. is still at Rome; but he is there under conditions harder for his great soul to bear than would be the worst exile. To owe that purple

to those who have cast lots for his Pontifical robe! To receive the aims of a fictitious sovereignty from the hand that has torn in pieces his legitimate States! To submit to a protection which conscience justly indicts as the cause of all the evil! Is there any bitterness like to this bitterness? If the measure is not yet full, it may become so any day.

The august and venerated Pontiff, whose ungrateful children, in the way of sorrows where they eternalise his passion, lengthen the road from Olivet to Cavalry, Pius IX. owes himself to the Christian people, and his mission to his sovereign apostleship; and, a victim of duty, superior to the human feeling which murmurs within him, he will stay in that Roman prison as long as his spiritual liberty shall not be openly fettered.

But do we know the exact limit at which this long-suffering patience will expire and ought to expire? Is it for us, is it for any man soever to determine how much oppression and persecution a Pope must bear, for the sake of his Pontifical conscience? No; he alone, the Successor of St. Peter, has a right to take counsel before God, and on the day that the Vicar of Jesus Christ shall decide that, in the presence of God, for the honor and glory of the Church, for the welfare and salvation of souls, it is his duty no longer to accept a protection more cruel than hostility itself, and guarantees borrowed from the spirit of the coward Pilate when they are not in the fashion of the traitor Judas—where will then be, we ask, all those political calculations which think themselves masters of the situation?

This has been understood at Paris. These fears manifestly betray themselves in the article of the *Constitutionnel* which we have put before our readers. It is vainly sought to give them another appearance with the help of all sorts of artifices. They tell us of the simplification of the French political question, which will result from the Holy Father's departure. Can the *Constitutionnel* give credit to such sophistry? No, no; the day when Pius IX., releasing the Imperial Government from the crafty promise which it has made to watch over the Pontiff's person, shall descend the steps of the Vatican to take his way into exile—that day the worst political dangers will arise for France—for, that day, a bottomless abyss will open under every throne in Europe.

Those who think they protect Pius IX. are in reality covered by the remnant of that moral force which the indestructible old man of Rome communicates to society by still remaining on his tottering throne. But is not the measure exhausted? The cry of alarm wrung from the *Constitutionnel* is a symptom of it. And if this awful fact be consummated, who is the cause of it? On this question of responsibility we do not fear the quibbles of the *Constitutionnel*. In the eyes of the whole world the responsibility is at Paris, exclusively at Paris. Let them not try to shift it on Rome.—*Brain Public (of Gand.)*

As a matter of course rumours accumulate thickly. Not Austria only, but Spain, Bavaria, and Belgium are said to have offered a residence for the Holy Father. Indeed, it is actually asserted by the Paris correspondent of the *Herald*, that negotiations had been entered into between the Cardinal Secretary of State and the British Government to provide a retreat for the Pope at Malta. This is not very probable we imagine. There is more force in the reason given for a preference being shown towards Belgium, viz., that the position of neutrality guaranteed to that Kingdom by the Great Powers enables it to offer, during these troublous times, the greatest chance of quietude and of peaceable security to the Supreme Head of the Church.

The same writer offers to guarantee the authenticity of a statement to the effect that "after the French expedition to Rome, in 1851, the French Government was eager to obtain the amount of the expenses (seventeen millions of francs) which this military expedition had cost to establish the temporal and spiritual authority of the Pope in Rome and in all the States of the Church."

The Pope, however, it is stated, was obliged to avow the impossibility of making this repayment, and solicited on the part of France an indefinite delay. It was then that Louis Napoleon offered the Pope to charge himself with the payment of these seventeen millions of francs, giving to the Pope a full and entire discharge on the express condition that His Holiness would formally make the engagement to nominate, on the first opportunity, the Abbe Bonaparte as Cardinal, as he being a member of the Imperial family. The situation in which the Pope then found himself did not allow him to give a refusal, and he made the engagement by a formal document which remains deposited in the secret archives of the Tuilleries.

The writer points out the consequences of the nomination of the Abbe Bonaparte as Cardinal, which sooner or later will take place in virtue of the engagement thus made. It is evident, he says, that the Emperor, in sacrificing these seventeen millions, has positively in view the compulsory choosing of his cousin as Pope after his election as a member of the Sacred College.—*Weekly Register.*

NAPLES.—The desertions from the Neapolitan army seem to have left a nucleus of troops faithful to the King, who gave a good account of a party of Garibaldians that ventured to attack them near Capua on the 18th and 21st. There are about 30,000 of them, and their number is daily increased by the Royalists, who are flocking to the King's standard. Garibaldi has become completely entangled by the Mazzinian party, and his nominations of greedy Lombards to all the places of trust in Naples and Sicily are beginning to arouse the wrath of the natives. Anarchy prevails, the reign of the dagger is beginning, and the Italian revolution has already passed the rose-water phase of loyalty patriotism, and religion. The Jesuits have been banished, Cardinal Sforza, the Archbishop of Naples, has been deported to Genoa, and the *umanitar* and chaplain of Garibaldi is the infamous Gavazzi. People are beginning to ask themselves what Garibaldi has done that such unlimited confidence should be placed in him, and the signs of a vast defection from his cause are becoming every day clearer.

But the Dictator of Naples and Sicily is only becoming more self-satisfied and more headstrong. He still insists that in spite of France he will proclaim Italian unity from the *campidoglio* of Rome. His quarrel with Carour and Fanti has become incurable; one or the other party must yield. Now, as Carour has all the political cleverness, and Garibaldi none, it will only be a struggle between wit and brute force, in which the former, in the long run, must prevail, unless force can crush its antagonist in the first instance. But, notwithstanding that the rogues are falling out, the honest men are as yet in vain looking for any opening for the recovery of their rights. The Piedmontese army, which marched into the Roman States to protect Rome from Garibaldi, is quietly co-operating with Garibaldi's navy off Ancona. Everywhere there is the most barefaced hypocrisy, and it is impossible to look with any equanimity into the dark and seething future, erept with the promise of God in our minds that he is with His Church for ever, and that Peter is the rock on which she is built.

It is by no means astonishing to see how slowly the revolutionary papers in England acknowledge the fact of their pet Garibaldi having sustained a defeat. It is only on Thursday that a glimmer of truth begins to appear when we are coolly told by the daily papers that Garibaldi's army has met with a check before Capua. It attacked the Royal troops: they say it was Bixio's Brigade. After a smart cannonade the Garibaldians were driven back by a brilliant charge of cavalry and returned to their positions, with a loss of 400 killed and wounded, and leaving 300 prisoners in the enemy's hands. The King of Naples is at the head of 50,000 men, and will show fight. Bosco, who had been accused of following Nizza's example, is with the King, and has said that all the Piedmontese will ever get of him will be his corpse on the battlefield.