

**A Warning voice from the Spanish Armada.**

BY MAJOR GENERAL T. D. COLLINSON, R.E.

(Continued from page 340.)

List of the Spanish Armada that sailed from Lisbon at the end of May, 1588.

The Portuguese squadron. Commanded by—The Duke of Medina Sidonia, 12 vessels of various kinds.

The Castile squadron. Commanded by General Diego Florez de Valdez (the most experienced sailor in the fleet), 16 vessels of various kinds.

The Andalusian squadron. Commanded by—General Pedro de Valdez, 11 vessels of various kinds.

The Biscayan squadron. Commanded by General I. M. de Recalde (the upper Admiral), 14 vessels of various kinds.

The Guipuzcoan squadron. Commanded by General Miguel de Oquendo, 14 vessels of various kinds.

The Italian squadron. Commanded by General M. de Bortendona, 10 vessels of various kinds.

The Urcas squadron. Commanded by General Gomez de Medina, (store ship) 23 vessels of various kinds.

Tenders, caravels, &c. Commanded by General A. H. de Mendoza, 22 vessels of various kinds.

The galleasses of Naples. Commanded by Don H. de Moncada, 4 vessels of various kinds.

The galeras, or galleys. Commanded by Captain D. Medrado, 4 vessels of various kinds.

The second in command was Don Al. de Leyva, and Don Fr. de Bobadilla and Don D. de Pimentel were chief officers.

The total number of vessels given by Don D. de Pimentel was altogether 145, of which 110 were men of war, and 90 very large.

The total tonnage of the whole fleet was..... 59,120

The total number of guns..... 3,165  
 " " soldiers..... 19,265  
 " " mariners..... 8,253  
 " " galley slaves... 2,088

By Mottley, on the authority of Spanish writers.

Don D. de Pimentel said that daily allowances was issued for 32,000 people.

The size of the men of war varied from 300 to 1,200 tons. Pimentel's own ship (a galleass of Portugal) was 700 tons.

The galleons were huge, clumsy vessels, with round sterns, built up at stem and stern like castles, and with bulwark musket proof, and the lower work four or five feet thick, which was proof against small guns.

The galleys were rowed by slaves, who sat amidships; the bow and stern had each enormous towering structures, like castles. The cannons were placed both in these and between the benches of the slaves.

The galleasses were similar, but one third larger; each of these was rowed by 300 slaves.

Pinaces and caravels were small sailing vessels, about the size of modern yachts.

All the vessels were over weighted with top hamper in proportion to their draught, and could bear but little canvas, even in fine weather.

A large vessel carried 63 guns; Pimentel's carried 32, but one third of the guns were of cast iron. There were at least 40 rounds of ammunition per gun.

The Spanish soldiers on board the Armada contained the picked veterans of Spain, and

were considered to be the pith of the whole expedition.

The Armada was said to be provisioned for six months. A Spanish record made by order of King Philip, gives the following list of provisions on board:—

- 110,000 quintals of biscuit.
- 6,500 " bacon.
- 3,458 " goats' cheese.
- 8,000 " fish.
- 3,000 " rice.

The quintal being 101 1/4 lbs. avordupois. 6,320 septiers of beans or white peas (of 1 1/2 bushel each).

- 14,170 pipes of wine (of 110 gallons).
- 11,398 arrobas of olive oil, of 3 1/2 gal's each.
- 33,870 arrobas of vinegar. " "

11,870 pipes of water which would be a poor provision for 30,000 people for six months. It gives, however, some notion of the difference in feeding of the Spaniard and the Englishman of that time.

The same authority gives the following arms on board:—7,000 arquebusses, 1,000 musquets, 10,000 pikes, 1,000 partisans, 6,000 half pikes, so that the proportion of fire arms to soldiers was nearly one half; a greater proportion than in the English forces; and the Spaniards had, no doubt, better fire arms, and were more practised in their use.

**Construction of Spanish Ships.**

Sir W. Monson, an Admiral of those days and a great naval critic, had not a high opinion of the Spanish navy. He says their vessels were generally constructed for commerce rather than war; that they were commanded by soldiers who were ignorant of the sea and despised the real seaman; that Philip had to get ships and seamen from other parts of his dominions than Spain; the good vessels in the Armada being other than Spanish; and that generally the English were at that time superior to the Spanish at sea, but this was owing, not to the construction of the ships, but to "the irresolution and insufficiency of the men." One is rather surprised to hero this of the conquerors of the New World and rulers of an empire on which the sun never set, but we must recollect that it was the Portuguese who first led the way in maritime discovery, and that Philip had the control over the naval resources of Portugal, which he used for the Armada to an extent disastrous to that country.

Sir William enters into the discussion of construction of vessels with a zeal that would have given him a prominent place in naval literature had he lived in the days of ironclads. He does not coincide in the opinion we find expressed by other sea captains of the time, to the small advantage of the small handy English ships; for, "as he puts it, in a maxim worthy to be handed down by English sailors, "when you speak of the strength of ships, you must speak of the sufficiency of the men within her." Sufficiency, not of quantity, but of quality. Therefore he says, "I would rather desire a reasonable ship of the King of Spain's manned with Englishmen, than a very good ship of her Majesty's manned with Spaniards." In short he lends us to infer that, in his opinion, the Spanish Armada was defeated, not by superiority of ships, but of seamen; a view of naval warfare which in these days of scientific naval construction, ought not to be obscured. Indeed, he commends the galleys, vessels, which failed beyond all in the Armada, and especially the "gallinas of Venice," as "low and snug by the water," "carrying the force of a ship in men and ordnance;—"not swift, but certain;"—in

fact, the "Destruction" of her day. Thus we learn, from the criticisms of this expert of the time, that, although the size and construction of ships may alter from age to age the different classes of them necessary for naval war will remain much the same throughout all ages, and the main naval strength of a country will always depend on the quality of the seamen.

**Preparations in the Netherlands.**

The Duke of Parma, King Philip's Viceroy in that part of the Netherlands which still acknowledged his rule, was considered one of the best soldiers of his day, and was, besides, an able ruler and diplomatist. If Philip had put the whole affair of the invasion of England into his hands, the issue might have been very different; but, fortunately for this country, Philip's habitual distrust made him limit Parma's action to the preparation of the main body of the land forces required, and Parma appears to have done his part with completeness, zeal, and caution. For he had his forces fully equipped for their work long before the Armada was ready; and during the whole time the preparations were going on, he succeeded in so blinding Queen Elizabeth and her councillors, that negotiations for peace were carried on up to the last minute; and one of her Commissioners in the Netherlands writes confidently of Parma's pacific intentions on the day when the Armada was having its first engagement with the English fleet.

By April, 1588, Parma had collected, under pretence of subduing the newly united Provinces, and of checking France, a force of the following composition and numbers:—

<b>Infantry.</b>	
Spanish.....	8,718
Italian.....	5,339
Burgundian, Irish, and Scotch....	3,278
Wallon.....	17,823
German.....	19,925
Garrisons of fortresses.....	1,130
	<hr/>
	56,265
<b>Cavalry.</b>	
German.....	3,650
Foreign mercenaries.....	668
	<hr/>
Total.....	60,533

Of this total force, it was expected that about 30,000 would be available for the invasion of England; and this 30,000 had dwindled down to 16,000 by August from sickness and other causes.

These were collected from all the dominions of Philip, and contained many experienced and celebrated bodies of troops. There was the Terzio or Legion of Naples, 3,500 strong, every man in which had armour either inlaid or gilded; and the young adventurers, Catholic nobles of Europe, flocked to the Netherlands to serve under so distinguished a leader on so important an expedition. He had already prepared, during the year 1587, a large stock of war material suitable for the undertaking: rafts and oars for landing, fascines and sand bags to form temporary shelter at first, timber for stockading quickly the posts occupied, barrels and superstructure for temporary bridges, special carriages for quickly getting his field guns up on landing; and he had built, or purchased from the North German ports, 400 vessels, which he describes as mere transports, many of them flat bottomed, and incapable of making any fight at sea; although both Philip and the English appear to have thought he had an independent war fleet, and, by acting on that belief, caused difficulties on both sides.