

CONTENTS OF No. 11, VOL. VIII.

POETRY.—

What I Saw..... 160

EDITORIAL:—

Admiral Porter's Torpedo Report..... 162

Lecture on Tactics..... 162

Army and Navy Journal on Torpedoes..... 161

Terms of Admission to National Club..... 161

The News of the Week..... 157

CORRESPONDENCE:—

Mitraille..... 158

Sabreur..... 158

Consistency..... 158

SELECTIONS:—

The Militia System..... 168

Ship Gunners Practice..... 160

A Torpedo Detector..... 160

Mr. Carlyle's Knighthood..... 160

The Early Migrations of the Anglo-Saxon..... 161

Race..... 161

Livingstone's Last Journey..... 165

Oxford vs. Cambridge..... 161

Armament of Ships of War..... 168

Senator Sumner..... 161

REVIEWS..... 161

REMARKS..... 160



The Volunteer Review,

AND

MILITARY AND NAVAL GAZETTE.

"Unbribed, unbought, our swords we draw,
Toward the Monarch, fence the Law."

OTTAWA, TUESDAY, APRIL 14, 1874.

To CORRESPONDENTS.—Letters addressed to either the Editor or Publisher, as well as Communications intended for publication, must, invariably, be *pre-paid*. Correspondents will also bear in mind that one end of the envelope should be left open, and at the corner the words "Printer's copy" written and a two or five cent stamp (according to the weight of the communication) placed thereon will pay the postage.

MILITARY re-organization—like religious and political reform—presents all the phenomena attendant on those great movements of thought which agitate peoples and nations—it partakes more largely than either of the latter in merely speculative ideas, for the very obvious reasons that more material personal interests are involved or supposed to be in its various phases, and it admits of any amount or variety of theoretical display—there can be very little wonder then at the number of schemes which have been propounded, the only similarity amongst them consisting of the unanimity with which the modesty of the inventor clothes his ideas of the "advantages to be derived from his own peculiar variety."

We have had to chronicle a variety of nostrums for the ostensible advantage of the Canadian army, all and every one tend

ing to the total overthrow of a system which has not only been tried but found to answer tolerably well all the demands made on its resources, and are not only the best ever adapted to the social position of the people of Canada, but also the only one that costs the minimum of time and expense, both considerations of great value in a new country possessed of very limited resources, and a sparse population. It has been alleged against the present Militia System that it fails to keep full musters in the ranks, that there is not sufficient drill to make thorough soldiers of the men, that it bears exclusively on a certain class, and that no value has been received for the outlay.

As the case really stands, apart from all exaggeration, we find that of the whole force enrolled up to and ending in the year 1872, five-sixths could be mustered to put in the annual drill in camp, while as far as returns go for 1873, a year distinguished by what well may be termed injudicious and parsimonious neglect, fully three-fourths of the force were under arms.

About the question of sufficient drill there is, doubtless, a good deal of both professional feeling and impracticable aspirations, the main requisite for a soldier in Canada, as far as minor tactics are concerned, is to acquire a thorough knowledge of his weapon and its efficient use, judged by that standard and the average ability of what (those great examples and patterns appealed to by all army reformers) the Prussians call shootists, the Canadian soldier need not fear to be put in the field against the best drilled troops in the world. We are quite well aware that parade movements are an absolute necessity, not only to mobility and facility for handling troops in the field, but also to discipline, without which the best appointed troops are nought, but all this could be acquired by the average Canadian soldier in three months; and we can see no reason why the resources of the country should be wasted in attempting to establish in peace time a perfection in minor tactics only attainable during active hostilities in the field. We are opposed to the idea of a standing army—it fulfills none of the condition necessary for the service of the State, and the example of England is quite enough to shew that apart from its expense its existence is insufficient to extinguish the military spirit of the people; for a proof of this we have only to look to the period before the era of standing armies to see what a superior class of recruits the rural districts of Old England supplied to the forces of her Sovereigns, and compare them with the results of the experiment of the re-organization to-day in which the *preserve* for the recruits is to be found in the refuse of the population of London and the proverbial White Chapel gutter snipe the types of her manhood and the defenders of her wealth—and upholders of her honor. Those are the direct results, of the system of standing armies, and of the growing tendencies of the

times to introduce democratic ideas and institutes into what is strictly a close aristocratic organization, in which every man should follow his *natural* chief to the field.

That it bears exclusively on a class is beyond doubt, it could not be otherwise, because as Sir GARNET WOLSELEY truly says: "It takes a man to make a soldier," and not more than 5 per cent. of the population could in any case be detached for active service in the field. And one of the best features in the militia law, is that one which makes it imperative on the *natural* chief to provide his contingents in order to secure his rank, thus placing the organization on its true and natural basis, and it reflects no honor on the country that the class to whom the duty of protection is confided have received no compensation at all commensurate with the services it has rendered, and that neglect is the sole evil attending the Canadian militia. As to the value received, Canada has an army of 43,000 men; we have no hesitation in saying that 25,000 of those could be placed in the field in ten days, if occasion required, and the balance within a fortnight; it is quite safe to challenge either England or the United States to do as much with all their resources in the same time; the cost is, say on the average, \$1,250,000 per annum and is a shade over \$29 per head per arm. The charge of men on the muster roll during the last five years has at least trained double that number to the use of the rifle, so that they would not be like the poor lad at the battle of Inkerman who is described as marching to the rear badly wound with his musket at the shoulder not knowing how to use it—and this man was a British regular soldier. It is hard to imagine what those people mean by proposing to withdraw a large contingent (compared with the resources of the country) from its population, for the purpose of establishing skeleton battalions who are to be trained to an ideal degree of excellence in parade movements. The alleged propose of leaving the mass is wholly insufficient to account for it, as two or three thousand drilled soldiers would take a long time indeed to leaven a force of two or three hundred thousand who had obtained no previous training. If we are to read the present and probable future by any means, it must be by the light of the past, and the nearest incident in point of comparison is the United States. In the first years of the late civil war, they had a regular army over of 16,000 men, they had also the advantage of well trained officers, probably in that respect the best in the world, yet all this did not leaven the mass of men who was obliged to be put in the field, and it was not until the whole force was thoroughly and carefully trained *de novo* that the advantages obtained from a class of highly trained officers began to tell; it is evident, then, that this example teaches us that Canada has received full value for the outlay on