

thropy or loyalty to any body with which one may associate himself, as his church or school or club or set.

3. God. Religious interest.

There are surely other kinds, some of which seem as if they were as distinct as these, and as important to take account of in education. For instance, the interest, which everyone feels and which every child manifests—in his own efforts and performances. The *interest of achievement* seems to me to rank by the side of speculative interest, and to precede, in the process of development, sympathetic interest. Then there is the interest with which everyone regards events that affect his own well-being, success, comfort, convenience, and the like. The interest which we take in the prospective changes of the weather is not always strictly scientific. The interest of the candidate in the returns, of the culprit in the verdict, etc., are examples of a kind of interest for which I see no place in the Herbartian classification.

If now the nature of interest is correctly and clearly discerned, its value in education and in life must be evident.

Its relation to education is twofold, as a means and as an end. In the first aspect its value is generally appreciated; in the second, it is not. Every teacher and every intelligent parent knows that the pupil learns, not only more easily but more thoroughly, what is interesting to him than what is not. That interest is one of the best, if not the very best, means of securing attention and effort is a common assumption. It is, of course, better than fear, better than hope of reward, better than shame or pride or emulation, better than even the conviction of duty and the desire to become wiser or nobler or more useful; it is, at least, a more *effective* motive than these last, for if a real interest in any matter exists, the energy of the

soul—intellect, emotion, desire, and will—is enlisted in its pursuit.

But suppose my pupil is not interested in what he should do or learn, what am I to do then? Interest would be the right motive, of course, and it will cause him to do his duty if it existed, but it is lacking, and I cannot seem to produce it. Must I not find a substitute? My boy ought to learn this thing. Must I not compel him? Well, certainly if he *ought*, he *must*. You are entirely sure about the *ought*? Then it is his duty and yours that the thing be done. Duty is imperative. Are we, then, done with interest, granting that we have found an effective motive in its place? May I, a teacher, say I wish my pupils were interested in their work? They would enjoy it so much better, and teaching would be so much more agreeable; but they are not, and, to tell the honest truth, I do not succeed in making them interested, so I have to make them learn some other way. Then suppose I have taken high ground and have found in a sense of duty a substitute for interest. My pupil consents that it is his duty to study, and he goes to work faithfully. He accomplishes his task and does it well. Still he is not interested and finds no delight or spontaneous going forth of his mind upon his task; but he is loyal and obedient, and my substitute for interest is effective. I might have found an emulation, or something else, as effective a motive as duty, but that would be lower and attended with moral peril. I have chosen the highest motive, and succeeded with it. Have I not done well? A good many of us are impelled to our daily tasks by a sense of duty. Is that not right? Certainly the conviction of duty is a high motive in education. Whatever happens or does not happen, we ought zealously to perform our duty. If we have no interest in learning to