

larly in an unstable society, governments that want to retain power need constantly to undercut potential support for opposition forces.

Three attitudes

Three basic sets of attitudes to the question of political participation will be outlined, and then the reasons for the varying "mix" in particular regimes will be analysed in terms of factors both internal and external to the institution of the armed forces. The first response to the problem of participation will be called "restorative". Other terms that might fit include "normalizing", "democratic", and "moderating", although all these terms beg huge questions about what exactly is to be restored, normalized or moderated, and how.

Nonetheless, the military themselves sometimes have clear ideas of what they wish restored. This has not been so in Portugal, Greece, Brazil for much of the time since 1964, or in Argentina after 1966, but it clearly was so in the various military overthrows of personalist, populist dictators in Colombia, Venezuela and Argentina in the 1950s and, in a different way, in the infrequent but decisive political moves of the Chilean armed forces.

The second approach we shall call "personalist" or "opportunist". This type is beginning to disappear in Latin America, in part because the military institution, particularly as it becomes better trained and more professional, can itself be bitterly anti-personalist; in Argentina, for example, there is determination not to repeat the experience of Peron. It tends to occur in less-developed countries with low levels of socio-economic development, especially in such areas as literacy and urbanization; Duvalier and Amin might be cases in point, and Stroessner definitely is. The approach to political participation here tends to be anti-institutional and populist — not always, however, because a personalist dictator such as Stroessner has nothing of the Bonapartist or demagogue in him but much of the paternalist.

The third attitude to political participation, the revolutionary, tends to be

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Argentine determination not to repeat experience of Peron

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Story of politics

Canadian ts perhaps not sufficiently realized how
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as was re any doubts about their centrality. In
ombia in 1888, a decree defined sub-
sion as any attack on "the Catholic
gion, the Army, private property, and
legal monetary currency". In Latin
erica as elsewhere, the armed forces
l regard themselves in this way, as one
the few basic pillars of society.

lem The armed forces see themselves as
rdians of the nation, not servants of
atever government may be briefly in
ver. But they also know from experi-
e how divisive military activity in poli-
can be. When they feel themselves
igned to intervene, they therefore want
make it count. They go in to set up a
nd state that can impose order.

consider ical Military regimes want, understand-
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differing he people they rule, to foreign interests
l, above all, to themselves. Whatever
litical pre ir other objectives may be, they seek
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trends tow p establish their claim to decide what is
l from pol he country's best interests. They can
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ything to nt ways — by amending the constitu-
such optin or by introducing schemes for new
in Latir A ns of participation. Effective govern-
in countr nt requires some idea of what the ordi-
a culture, y citizen thinks and feels; and, particu-
of trends