

itical alignments, and will depend on the hour of the day or night.

But the perils and problems of tomorrow should not diminish the merits of the agreement between Hanoi and Washington. For it will reduce what has been a major international conflict to the scale of a local civil war.

Next: a two-stage blueprint of an aid program for Vietnam

Of the four different types of political outcome considered — a negotiated settlement, continued Vietnamization, co-existence between North and South, and two (or a unified) Communist Vietnams, the first and third would appear conducive to the use of multilateral assistance agencies for recovery and development programs. The second would make extensive multilateralization impossible. There would be a technical reason why the multilateral agencies could not function in co-operation with Communist governments in Vietnam; but, on the basis of experience and far, the political difficulties on both sides of the ideological curtain would probably inhibit such a development.

A study of possibilities for an international organizational role in the postwar recovery and development of North and South Vietnam was commissioned by the U.S. State Department. The report on a possible aid program for Vietnam was prepared by Dr. Andrew W. Cordier, senior dean of the School of International Affairs, Columbia University, and former senior United Nations official, and Miss Ruth B. Russell, research associate at the school. Completed in the spring of 1972, it examined possible political outcomes and alternative aid programs. The study is one of a series designed to supplement the State Department's own capabilities and to provide independent expert views to departmental officers and analysts. Its publication does not indicate endorsement by the State Department nor should its contents be construed as reflecting the official position of the U.S. Government. The accompanying excerpts represent a summary of the study's conclusions.

There are two basically different types of assistance programs that might be applied through multilateral agencies when conditions permit:

(1) A massive "crash program" type, expected to be carried out by large-scale funding and special institutional arrangements such as an "UNRRA for Vietnam", a "multilateral Marshall Plan," or some *ad hoc* consortium or consultative group on the pattern of the one formed for Indonesia. This approach essentially seeks to achieve "reconstruction" within a relatively short period of time.

(2) A mixed type of program based on a longer-term view of the situation that breaks the problem down into shorter-term relief and rehabilitation aspects and longer-term development issues, with appropriate modalities for each.

War-damage fund

We would favour combining a short-term, autonomous, international war-damage fund under United Nations administration with an incremental effort to bring the former Indochina countries into the mainstream of expanded, regular, international economic development programs in Southeast Asia as soon as possible.

We visualize the specialized war-damage fund (limited in time and in scope to relief, rehabilitation and repair of rather closely defined war damage to persons and property) as based on the institutional model of the Fund of the United Nations for the Development of West Irian (FUNDWI) and using some of the techniques of UNRRA (UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration), and the effort to normalize development assistance for the Indochina countries as using the wide variety of existing inter-