

General of the United Nations.

Mr. Acheson had emphasized that the Korean situation could only be dealt with and intelligently understood as a phase (and not in the long run the most important phase) of the general conflict between the free and Communist worlds. Strategically, Korea was not important and the decision to resist aggression there had been primarily determined by political considerations. The incident, however, had underlined a very dangerous international situation. Great importance was attached to the United Nations' character of the action as, if United States forces were committed alone, there was danger that American public opinion would favour preparing in isolation for the possible larger conflict ahead. If all free democracies would co-operate towards putting themselves in a position to save freedom from the menace of international Communism it would be infinitely easier for each of them to achieve a common objective to preserve peace.

As far as Korea was concerned, Mr. Acheson was emphatic that even single battalions would be not only of political value but effective help. He did not feel that the danger of directing too much strength to Korea was a real one. Six or seven divisions would be all that would be required. These would not in any event save the free world if a general conflict began but they could be very valuable in Korea, would make general war less likely and co-ordinated international effort for further re-armament far more acceptable to public opinion than if the United States withdrew from Korea, were defeated there, or won there alone.

Mr. Acheson then outlined the very extensive measures the U.S. Government would take to increase its own preparedness and that of its allies. The United States were most anxious to have this positive evidence of their own determination matched with equal determination in friendly countries. In the case of a general war, American forces in Korea would have to be withdrawn as soon as possible. The free countries would have to do what they could to defend themselves while American air power was brought to bear on Russian cities and industries. If there were aggression elsewhere similar to that committed in Korea through Communist satellites, he thought the United Nations should meet the challenge in the same way it had in Korea, although the United States would probably not be able to take the initial responsibility in repelling aggression that it had been able to take in Korea.

2. Mr. Pearson also reported on the discussions with senior U.K. and U.S. officials. These had been principally on the way in which the United Nations contributions of ground forces could be integrated into the operations in Korea under the United Nations Command. There would appear to be four possible types of offers of forces from countries other than from the United

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