

Sixth fact. I did not leave England till the beginning of April, by which time the secretary of state must have known, or ought to have known, that no dependance could be placed upon reinforcements from England arriving at New York in time for Sir William Howe to resume the intention he had deferred, viz. a diversion from Rhode Island, or of making the force upon Hudson's River adequate to offensive operation.

Hence arises my second proposition, that the latitude I had proposed, or other expedients of precaution, ought then at least to have been adopted: instead of which, I was suffered to sail, ignorant of Sir William Howe's plans, and ignorant of the defalcation or the delays in the reinforcements destined for him. The consequence was, that neither his letter to Sir Guy Carleton, put into my hands after my arrival in Canada, nor his letter to me of the 17th of June, informing me of his destination for Pennsylvania, removed my expectation of co-operation, because I was to suppose, that subsequent to the dates of either of those letters, he would receive orders from the secretary of state respecting the junction, and also a timely reinforcement.

Seventh fact. The secretary of state makes no mention of the northern expedition in any of his dispatches to Sir William Howe at the end of March, when my orders were fixed, nor in the month of April. And it is a further fact, that I am persuaded will not be contested, that he did not mention any orders or recommendations relative to co-operation verbally to Sir William Howe's aid-de-camp, or any other confidential person who failed about that time.

The first mention made of the necessity of co-operation was in the secretary of state's letter of the 18th of May, wherein his Lordship "*Trusts that whatever he [Sir William Howe] may meditate, it will be executed in time to co-operate with the army ordered to proceed from Canada.*"

The proposition clearly justified by these facts is, that if the secretary of state had thought proper to signify the