

*The Address—Mr. Trudeau*

(6) Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.

(7) Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.

(8) Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.

(9) Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.

(10) Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

As decalogues go, this may seem modest. But I wonder, in this period when there are positive signs of emergence from a time of crisis, whether there is not sound purpose in going back to basics, beginning again with a commitment to principles which can be shared, finding a place to start—surveying a little common ground on which to stand. Therefore, we intend to draw on these ten principles to develop elements of a common purpose among the leaders of both East and West.

I shall be writing to President Reagan and to President Andropov, to leaders of both alliances, and to other statesmen, to propose that these are principles upon which both sides can and should build, because there are points of agreement as well as disagreement. There is a way around the impasse of recent months. There are signs of promise and I believe that the trend line of crisis has turned.

As we look back on our work over the past four months and look to the months ahead, I am encouraged that we are beginning to see results. We sought to catalyse a dialogue between East and West, and that is happening. We sought to persuade both sides to tone down their rhetoric, and that has begun to happen.

● (11:30)

I sought to associate myself with like-minded leaders in several countries of the world. Many of them have begun, or continued, to make their own contribution to a reduction of tensions, to put forward their own proposals for arms control. My colleague the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs and I have pursued the Canadian initiative in multilateral institutions, in bilateral relations, at special conferences and in dialogue with groups and individuals.

We have injected political energy into East-West relations; but political energy is not, by itself, enough. It must be nourished by imagination, fortified by persistence, and confirmed by action; by imagination to find new ideas, which break old deadlocks and address emerging dangers; by persistence to negotiate new agreements and to meet the challenge of technology; by action in the form even of small steps as evidence of good faith; by action on specific tasks, such as developing the means to verify arms control agreements, or in regularly scheduled consultations between East and West.

*[Translation]*

In the months ahead Canada will build on the progress so far achieved, to ensure that our ideas are further developed and implemented. We have no monopoly of proposals, nor do we expect them to gain acceptance overnight. What counts is that some, though by no means all, of the key East-West indicators show that their downward course has been arrested. My own personal contribution, though necessarily less intensive than in recent months, will definitely continue. After all, Mr. Speaker, sixteen countries plus the United Nations in three months is a pace that would be hard to sustain year-round, but I intend to go to Moscow, whenever circumstances permit. Our initiative will also be taken forward by my Cabinet colleagues, by our ambassadors abroad and by all Canadians who share our purposes.

Canada will play its part in the councils of the West, in bilateral talks, at multilateral meetings and conferences, in contacts with the Soviet Union and its allies.

We shall work vigorously for progress in the Stockholm Conference and the MBFR talks. If these talks bog down, Canada will endeavour to ensure that political leaders again take a personal hand in energizing them. Once the MBFR negotiations resume in March, it will be imperative that NATO respond to the proposal made last summer by the Warsaw Pact.

Following further consultations with our NATO allies, we shall in the course of the current session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, circulate three proposals to gear down the momentum of new technology. We will thus give additional substance to the strategy of suffocation which I put forward in 1978. These proposals are: a ban on high-altitude anti-satellite systems; restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs; and improvements in the verifiability of future strategic weapons.

In the months leading up to next year's review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we shall continue to press both sides to keep the NPT bargain, for security is indivisible. If countries which do not now have nuclear weapons acquire them, then everyone's security is diminished.

The basis of the NPT bargain was that the nuclear powers would reduce their armaments in return for the non-nuclear powers not building their own, and that both would co-operate in sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Thus, the current nuclear weapons states bear an immense responsibility in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

Consequently, we must also continue to press our proposal for a conference of the five nuclear weapons states. It is a concept whose logic is compelling. Those five nuclear powers are at the same time the permanent members of the Security Council. They have responsibilities as well as vetoes. That is why I asked the UN Secretary General, Mr. Perez du Cuellar, to explore and to promote confidential meetings of their