

*Supply—National Defence*

Bomarc that it is difficult to reach conclusions. The minister has not told us that the Bomarc has been successfully tested against a supersonic target. He has said in reply to a question:

If it had been planned that it would be tested against a supersonic target, that would have been done. If it has not been, the intention is not to have it tested as at this date.

The truth is that when it was first tested against a supersonic target it missed. More recently we learned from the newspapers that it managed to contact jet targets but we still have not been told whether the targets were supersonic or subsonic. This is a question which should be answered. In fact, there are a number of other questions the minister should answer about it. Has it yet learned to track a target at low altitudes or is it still, as was the Bomarc A, ineffective at low altitudes? Can it still be jammed by approaching bombers when it switches from ground control to homing control or has that deficiency, too, been overcome? Is the minister familiar with the British operation Sunbeam and, if so, could he give the committee the benefit of the information he has which was gained by the British during that operation? If the minister cannot answer these questions satisfactorily, he should not be asking us to vote funds for Bomarc installations.

In addition to the defence against manned bombers it is obvious that we are going to have to have a defence against missiles. The United States is spending huge sums in this direction. We hope they will be successful. It is quite right that we should not attempt to duplicate their activities in this field. If they are able to develop an adequate defence weapon, however, it may become desirable for us to consider its use from Canadian bases.

The other area of possible Russian attack is from the sea. If they, the Russians, now have, or if they can or do develop a capability of launching missiles from submarines, we will have to meet the threat. We should be giving serious consideration to this matter now. It is widely held that the only effective defensive against atomic submarines is by other atomic submarines. If so, we should consider how we can best procure what we require.

The second major commitment referred to in the white paper is our NATO commitment in Europe. This has been and, in my opinion remains a most important contribution to collective security. Whereas the Russians are not likely to risk an all-out offensive while we maintain a powerful deterrent, they would not hesitate to indulge in local and limited probing if they thought

they could obtain limited objectives without detonating global catastrophe.

Canadian forces in Europe, while small, are effective and well trained. The psychological effect of having them there is invaluable for it helps to bind together the NATO alliance and sets an example to our partners. It is a clear warning to the Russians that we mean business. Any cutback in Canadian effort now could be the beginning of a chain reaction which might have serious and far-reaching consequences. By unswerving loyalty and devotion to principles we have long espoused such a possibility can be avoided.

We were very pleased to hear the minister's announcement that the air division will be re-equipped. The decision should have been made months ago but not later than last December when the minister was in Paris and when he had the opportunity to discuss these matters with the NATO commanders at SHAPE. However, better late than never. Not only are our airmen and army personnel there among the best trained and most effective, but they should have available to them the latest and most modern equipment we are able to provide.

The minister told us that he was going to re-equip eight of the air division squadrons which are presently equipped with the F-86 Sabre. He did not mention what he was going to do with the other four squadrons which are equipped at the present time with CF-100's—

**Mr. Pearkes:** Yes, I did.

**Mr. Hellyer:** —except that they should remain as they are at present, I quickly add. Is it possible that the NATO commander earlier had asked the Canadian government to re-equip the other four squadrons with CF-105 Avro Arrows, or if not with Avro Arrows with some such effective, high-altitude, all-weather interceptors?

Let us remember that strength created through NATO continues to be the guardian of peace. Let us remember that our soldiers, sailors and airmen remain the guarantors of our freedom. We have moved a great distance since the alliance was formed in 1949. Although there are military weaknesses and deficiencies, our strength stems from the fact that 15 countries have joined together in a common cause. Our objective should be to ensure that there are sufficient NATO forces in being to be capable of dealing with both nuclear and non-nuclear situations. They need not be massive but they must be strong enough to deal decisively with any attack short of the unmistakable deliberate all-out aggression. If we fail in this objective we