

hand, if that is not plausible, I think it is fair to admit that we are in no better position, if not in a worse position than we were two years ago in Korea. Getting back to that aspect of that and repeating the sentiments expressed by General Van Fleet not so many days ago that the aggression in Korea, in his opinion, would have to be finally stopped by a real attack on the aggressor, and that by initiating this real attack on the aggressor it still would not in any wise bring Stalin into the picture.

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: That is quite a question! On the first part of it, the economic burden on the free world of maintaining military operations in Korea indefinitely, I would only say that at the present time in Korea there are, I think, about seven United States divisions. There is also one Commonwealth division. The United States divisions include contingents from other countries and indeed Korean volunteers. Now you can judge for yourself whether the United States could maintain this force in Korea for some time, in those circumstances, without having any fatal effect on its economy. I am not suggesting that it is a desirable thing to do, but economically I would hate to think it was not possible. The intention, of course, is to build up Korean strength to a point where the Koreans will assume an even greater share of the battle than they do now, so from that point of view the economic burden is not unbearable.

The other question is a matter of opinion, whether it would be desirable to mount an offensive in an effort to drive the aggressors back to the Yalu river. General Van Fleet has only been reported in the press on this, and I think it would be well to wait until he is before the congressional committee in Washington to see what he has to say officially, but even he made it quite clear that this should not be done without greater military strength than the United Nations now possess out there. The problem, from the point of view of global strategy is not only whether an attack of that kind would invite a counter attack, because all the Chinese forces are not yet engaged in Korea. That is just one consideration. The other consideration is whether it would be desirable to reinforce the Korean front to such an extent at the expense of other places.

Mr. DECORE: Mr. Chairman, the minister the other day made some passing reference to psychological warfare. He did not dwell on it very much, and I wonder if the minister would care to elaborate now on just what the government's policy is in connection with psychological warfare, if there is a policy, and just how far we would be prepared to go with it at the present time.

Hon. Mr. PEARSON: That is a very difficult question for me or anybody to answer. After all, Canada is only one member of this coalition and not by any means the strongest or most important member and psychological warfare, which is an important aspect of the conflict in which we are unhappily engaged, would have to be the responsibility mainly of the major members of the coalition. I am thinking of the United States, the United Kingdom and France. They do participate in this kind of warfare. I do not like to use the word "warfare" in this connection, but they do attempt to bring the truth to the people behind the iron curtain by various methods notably, of course, broadcasting. It is important to coordinate these activities so that we all say the same thing, or if perhaps not precisely the same thing, that we follow the same principles. Canada does play a part through the C.B.C.I.S. and for the purpose we keep in very close touch with the Voice of America and the B.B.C. shortwave service, so that we do not contradict each other and so that what we do in this field dovetails into a general scheme of propaganda. You will have, Mr. Chairman, an opportunity to discuss the C.B.C.I.S. in detail. I gather that those concerned with its direction will appear before you.