

Southern Africa

The end of apartheid in South Africa, the independence of Namibia and the end of the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique have given rise to many hopes for the future of security relations in Southern Africa. The twelve states, large and small, that make up the region's security complex have suffered from the insecurities created by the apartheid regime, with its long-standing involvement in efforts to destabilize or overthrow neighbouring regimes. The post-apartheid transition has, however, brought its own insecurities, as neighbouring states are concerned with the continued possibility of South African hegemony in the region, or the possible consequences that a failure of its democratic experiment could bring.

Overall, the region would seem ripe for a possible transition to a peaceful security community, since the level of inter-state conflict and rivalry is relatively low. Such security cooperation has been promoted by various regional organizations, most notably by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and it has frequently been linked to the need to unlock resources for development.¹ Nevertheless, the post-apartheid, post-Cold War, peace dividend has so far only been manifest sporadically, at least as indicated by the data in Figure 22 below, which provides military expenditure data for six of the more important regional states. Although military spending has declined for states such as South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Angola (not shown), it has increased in states such as Botswana, Swaziland and Mauritius (not shown).² Even in Zimbabwe, defence spending may actually have increased since 1993, and is projected by government spokesmen to remain stable for the near future.³ In South Africa (note that figures are not shown to scale in Figure 22), defence spending has declined sharply from the apartheid-era high of \$4.9 billion in 1989 to only \$2.9 billion for 1993, a drop of more than 40 percent. But the

¹ For a general discussion of regional security issues in Southern Africa, see Ken Booth and Peter Vale, "Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Southern Africa," in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming); See Ken Booth and Peter Vale, "Security in Southern Africa: After Apartheid, Beyond Realism," *International Affairs* (London), 19 (1995), 285-304.

² Mozambique's military expenditures may also have declined slowly since 1993. Details of the Mozambican agreement with the IMF to cut military salaries and weapons purchases by up to 50 percent were offered in BBC, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, AL/W0373, 28 February 1995. The *Military Balance*, 1995/96 also indicates that Mozambican defence spending will drop to \$89 million in 1995, from more than \$100 million in 1992. Swazi military spending increased from \$10 million in 1989 to an estimated \$21 million in 1993; Mauritian spending from \$6 million to 11 million over the same period. Figures from ACDA, *WMEAT*, 1993-1994.

³ Defence was allocated a budget for 1994/1995 of \$212.3 million, up from the previous year's figures of \$204 million. Although these figures are not comparable with those offered in Figure 21, they do capture the trend line. See "Africa - Disarmament: Big Armies, Small Economies," *Inter Press Service*, 23 May 1996.