

contribute further to strengthening confidence and security by notifying smaller scale manoeuvres to other participating states with special regard for those near the area of such manoeuvres. All these measures were to be seen under the umbrella provision that participating states had a duty to refrain from the threat of the use of force in their relations with one another (a principle that is also enshrined in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter), as well as from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights.

In assessing this first generation of CSBMs in the CSCE context, one could say that they served two basic purposes. First, they served to inhibit the political exploitation of military force, "thus renouncing Clausewitz' concept that war (i.e. the use of force, and -in a more sophisticated manner- the threat of the use of force) was just the continuation of politics by different means."³⁵ Secondly, they served to reduce the danger of surprise attack by creating the obligation to give advance notification of manoeuvres beyond a certain level. It is true that this first generation represented only a modest first step in the area of confidence building. However, they stood as a great symbol of cooperation and can be credited with having led the way to more far-reaching agreements at later stages.

It should also be noted that with the exception of one large manoeuvre in 1981 in which advance notification was not given, all participating states duly fulfilled their duty to inform the other participating states about military exercises above the 25,000-level. In fact, many Western and neutral and non-aligned states extended the notification time beyond the required minimum. Those states also chose to notify manoeuvres at a lower threshold. The performance of the Warsaw Pact states however, was poor in the areas of voluntary notification at lower thresholds and observation by invitation however. In addition, no states chose to utilize the provision of the Final Act inviting them to notify other manoeuvres conducted by them, which tacitly meant naval and/or air exercises. No state gave notice of such undertakings.³⁶

The Second Generation: Stockholm, 1986

As the Stockholm measures mark a tangible advancement of the Helsinki regime, they are referred to as second generation CSBMs. The Stockholm Conference on Confidence-and Security-building

³⁵ Ibid., pg. 22.

³⁶ Ibid., pg. 23.