

this idea of developing a negotiating model, in which the other side decided what is cut instead of you deciding.

The one thing I do feel is that, if you look at the Soviet government and the American government at the moment, both of them would gain immediately by the sort of agreement I have discussed. The Americans claim that the Russians are already far ahead in anti-satellite weapons and in strategic defence. I ignore, for the sake of argument and for common sense reasons, the argument used by President Reagan that the Russians are ahead in every category of strategic nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, the Russians will gain very much because they know very well that, if the arms race continues, the Americans, according to the CIA, are well ahead in most of the new technologies which are relevant; they also have an enormous economic interest, if Mr. Gorbachev wants to improve the performance of the Soviet economy in making more available for consumers, so that skilled workers have something to spend their extra wages on, rather than pouring their money into new weapons.

I finish, if I still have time, Mr. Chairman, by a few words, but they can only be very few, about the effect of the sort of agreement I have been talking about on the security of America's allies. I speak as an ally who has some experience in this field and who is deeply involved at the moment in trying to judge the political consequences, rather than the military consequences, of the operation which I have been discussing.

First of all, there is no question — there is much evidence of this from recent meetings of the NATO Council — that America's European allies are much more worried about continuing the arms race and, particularly, deploying some sort of strategic defence than they are about the consequences of stopping it. Now that the American Congress has fallen out of love with defence spending — and we look forward to a period, perhaps of many years, in which defence spending will have to be kept level in real terms, perhaps even in nominal terms, as the Congress hopes — if the United States persists in continuing the nuclear arms race, it will have to make very heavy cuts in its conventional forces and in the forces which are mainly devoted to protecting its allies. Indeed, General Rogers himself has already given warnings on this point, as has Lord Carrington as the Secretary General of NATO.