

create themselves, they must have been immediately created by God.

T. Do you see nothing in the nature of man to distinguish him from other animals?

Y. Yes : I especially observe that he is capable of good and evil actions, which they are not ; that he is therefore a subject of reward and punishment ; that he is capable of reflecting with pleasure or dissatisfaction upon his actions, which faculty we call *conscience*.

T. Does not, then, the very nature which his Maker has given him bear an evident relation to *law or rule*, and to *reward and punishment*?

Y. Most clearly ; and from this I see another strong presumption arise, that a creature, who by his Creator is in his very nature constituted to be capable of moral government, must, from the beginning of his existence, have been placed under a *moral law*.

T. But does not a moral law manifestly suppose a *revelation*?

Y. Truly ; because law, being the will of a superior, must be *known* before it can be obligatory ; and it belongs to a legislator to *promulgate*, or, in other words, to *reveal* his laws.

T. But suppose it said, that man might *infer* the will of God from natural objects, and the course of divine government, without an express revelation, how would you reply?

Y. I would say, 1. That then the will of God on moral subjects must have been more imperfectly known in the first age, than in the following ages of the world, because men had had less time for observing nature, and less experience of the course of Providence. But this is contrary to all history and all tradition. 2. That by inference they could only at best obtain *imperfect* intimations of the will of God. And, 3. That the will of God would thus be made to depend upon the *opinions* of men, that is upon the just-

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