

there followed a new tariff in 1897. This largely abandoned specific duties in favour of ad valorem, increased the free list (notably in the case of corn, fence wire and mining machinery), reduced the duties on coal oil, breadstuffs, wheat and sugar. This tariff also introduced the British preference. Nevertheless the tariff remained, and is to-day, a moderate protectionist tariff.

IN providing a schedule intermediate between the British Preference and the general tariff, with a view to using this as an instrument of negotiation, Mr. Fielding has coupled with it the principle of trade treaties. He has accepted this principle when it has been discredited by the experience

TRADE TREATIES DISCREDITED of other countries. So early as 1860 France entered into a treaty with England whereby mutual concessions were arranged. France followed this by making similar treaties with other nations during the period 1860 to 1867. While there was present in this policy the idea of expanding French trade, the main idea of Napoleon, who entered into these treaties in the face of the opposition of the French legislative bodies, was to obtain for the Empire political strength and support abroad. When Germany was under the Zollverein it adopted, in 1865, a system of trade treaties by means of which concessions from the "autonomous," or general tariffs, were made through "conventional" or trade treaty tariffs. In the later working out of these arrangements many difficulties have been met. When Germany, in 1891, granted various reductions on agricultural productions from Roumania in order to obtain concessions for German manufactures the increased competition to which the German farmers were subjected called forth bitter opposition. In France the trend since 1890 has been steadily away from the trade treaty system.

Mr. Fielding recognizes that reciprocal arrangements may be made through legislation; he, however, considers such arrangements unsatisfactory because they are temporary in nature. He, therefore, favours the trade treaty system because it will give greater stability than can be obtained from simple legislative action. But the difficulty presented here is that while Canada's needs may, in the meantime, have changed, the country will, during the life of a treaty, be bound by certain fixed rates of duty. Important as is Canada's foreign trade, the maintenance and development of the home market is still more important. The fact that these trade treaties would have to include "most favoured nation" clauses would lead to other countries obtaining privileges in return for which no adequate concession had been obtained.

The Canadian legislation proposes maximum reductions of 10 per cent. In 1897 the United States provided that there might be general reductions of 20 per cent. But owing to the opposition of the Senate the treaties, negotiated under this arrangement, were not sanctioned. This legislation provided that the treaties negotiated should last not longer than five years, and that they should be approved by both Houses of Congress. The Canadian legislation contains no such limitation of term, and permits the Government to make any treaty without reference to Parliament. No tariff change which materially affects the net protection essential to Canadian industry should be made without the sanction of the people's representatives. The tariff is of public concern not only from the standpoint of the protection it affords, but also from the standpoint of the revenue it yields. The tariff and Canada's industrial independence are intertwined. And no arrangements should be entered into which would, when times of adversity came, prevent, until the termination of treaties, the tariff modifications called for by the country's changed condition. Peel's words in 1846 "wearied with our long and unavailing efforts to enter into satisfactory commercial treaties with other nations, we have resolved to consult our own interests" contain both a lesson and

a precept for Canada. Where reciprocal arrangements are essential, legislation and not treaties should be relied upon. Canada should not mortgage its fiscal independence.

JULIUS CAESAR, who was so suddenly unseated by the daggers of Brutus and Cassius, was a statesman who had made his way upwards on his own merits assisted by bread and circuses. Besides being a great man, he was a great briber. He won victories, rifled

CORRUPTION provinces and spent the plunder on his political ambitions. When he was out for votes, he never aimed to buy anything less than the whole city. His sad fate is introduced here, not to prove that two wrongs make a right, but to show that there were distinguished practitioners in the art of purchasing good opinion long before Mr. Hyman's misguided helpers entered the field.

Pericles, who died in the odour of sanctity with a reputation as long as your arm, was a wholesale purchaser of electoral favours. He was the politician who invented the "pork barrel." He not only bribed Athens with public buildings and threw all the art work his friend Phidias' way, but he was the first to make use of the sessional indemnity, which he carried so far as to pay the people for sitting through Aeschylus' plays at the theatre. Pericles was one of the most splendid corrupters of history. It is only now, after a couple of thousand years, that thoughtful people are beginning to find him out.

To pass from Greek and Roman to English history, there was Walpole, the father of corruption as he was the father of party government. With him bribery was a habit, a system, an organized instrument of administration. He was more shameless in his juggling of offices and appointments than Newcastle ever was. He paid for votes in Parliament with places and favours. He taught modern Premiers nearly all they know about keeping their followers in Parliament warm with promises, just how long to delay the reward, and other matters in which they excel. It was Walpole who originated the saying that every man has his price. Of one it might be a morsel of flattery, of another a woman's kiss, of a third a jewel, of a fourth judgeship, of a fifth a gift of money. Walpole knew how to reach every man on his softest side. If he did not bribe the mob of voters, it was because he had no need. They were pocket boroughs in those days and Walpole dealt with the men who had the boroughs in their pockets. By such arts he maintained himself in power for twenty years, perhaps the best twenty years England ever had in the way of Government. He gave the kingdom the breathing spell in which it gained a long start of the European nations; he put England in a position to lead the world in wealth and enterprise.

If we were disposed to go outside our text, electoral corruption, we could show how many great men have taken or given bribes. The names of Francis Bacon, Baron of Verulam, and John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough, rise at once to the mind. Enough has been said to indicate that the habit is widespread and the practice ancient. Only the other day in a moment of candour, a member of Parliament who has had experience blurted out that bribery was sheer waste of money. He was right. The crooked money does not irrigate public opinion in the way that was intended. Fully three-quarters of it sticks well up in the channel, the dark-lantern men having a pretty good notion where charity ought to begin and end. And as both sides do it, there is no reason why a voter of a thrifty turn of mind should not take money from both and vote in the long run according to his convictions. Some do, but such breaches of contract are in danger to be exposed, and the sources of revenue to be cut off, human ingenuity having found several ways of looking into a ballot box to see if the goods have been delivered.