ment to the alliance. This visit also enabled him to stress that we share with our allies a desire for close co-operation in many different areas and a common concern with the problems of security and *détente*.

It is obviously out of the question to attempt any definitive evaluation of such a trip at this time. Its repercussions and concrete results will become apparent during the coming months, creating in turn a "spin-off" effect in areas which could not be covered in the necessarily limited range of discussions at the prime ministerial level. It is certain, however, that the visit accomplished the important task of making our European partners aware of the difficulties of the undertaking and the qualifications imposed by our constitutional, political and economic situation. It also served to reassure them that we are serious in our efforts to escape as much as possible from the constraints imposed upon us by geography. In addition, the visit helped increase our reserves of good will and understanding among the European leaders, and at the same time made the general public in Europe m aware of Canada's situation, thanks to close co-operation received from the n media.

Escape from constraints of geography

In Canada, the visit served to impr upon the general public and Members Parliament, whose support is essential the success of our policy of diversificati the importance of Europe for Canada the Canadian people. It is, moreover, sig ficant that the Canadian Government response to the great interest in Eur aroused by the Prime Minister's trip, m the exceptional decision to table in House of Commons the principal do ments marking the progress of the Ca dian initiative with respect to the Nin namely Canada's memorandum to Nine dated April 20, 1974, the draft tr agreement which was attached to it a the Canadian communication of last S tember 26 to the political directors of Nine. Canadians who follow Europe affairs closely will undoubtedly be plea that these documents are now in the p lic domain.

The new triangle: Canada-France-Quebec

By Paul Painchaud

The primary purpose of Mr. Trudeau's European visit, we are told, was economic. It was also, however, part of a clearly political design involving Franco-Canadian relations, which have suffered periods of strain since 1967. For this reason, the realization of "the Third Option", which was the acknowledged purpose of the visit, included the normalization of relations between Ottawa and Paris.

In view of the state of affairs since General de Gaulle's visit, the normalization could not be achieved without Quebec's participation. Regardless of Quebec's scope for manoeuvre, or the degree of its influence in Paris and in Ottawa, in the final analysis there could be no *rapprochement* between France and Canada over Quebec's opposition or without its consent. For the Quebec government this was a political asset for which it could not claim full credit, but which represented the state of its relations with France over the past ten years. From this point of view, it has become an eq "diplomatic partner" with France Canada in the fullest sense of the term

France-Canada rapprochement requires Quebec consent

Paradoxically, Mr. Trudeau's trip serve to reinforce the effect of General Gaulle's visit, especially if, as appears be the case (this was written before Bourassa himself visited Paris), it res in no change in the basic character Franco-Quebec relations, or in their sc which has been unprecedented since 19 In practical terms, this visit clarifies consolidates the triangular situation t has developed between Canada and Fra By rendering Franco-Canadian relati much less "emotional" and putting th on a positive footing, Mr. Trudeau stabilized and, in effect, confirmed Franco-Quebec precedent. By the exer of a little imagination and effort, Quebec government will find that Trudeau's visit, far from having dim ished its potential for action, has in increased it. To all intents and purpos