

To begin with, the multiplicity of approaches has created ambiguities on which the parties to the conflict are capitalizing in their relations with the various players. Consequently, the political negotiating process must be returned to a common denominator. The international community must establish a common negotiating position and speak as one.

Second, the spearhead of our collective efforts must be the restoration of a functional link between the negotiating process and military operations in the field. As demonstrated by recent events, if it is disassociated from its political role, UNPROFOR runs the risk of quickly becoming a bargaining tool at the mercy of the belligerents. Under such circumstances, every setback every difficulty encountered by UNPROFOR will oblige us to reassess its existence. To achieve this close link between the negotiating process and military operations, all players must work to develop better co-ordination between the Contact Group and troop-contributing countries.

Third, we must take steps to restore UNPROFOR's credibility, which has recently been questioned by the parties to the conflict. Canada feels that, in the immediate future, the credibility and viability of peacekeeping forces depends on four factors:

- the consolidation of troops to avoid scattering and weakening the defence capability of UN forces;
- a review of UNPROFOR's mandate, with emphasis on those activities that are most likely to succeed, considering the resources currently available to troops and their safety;
- the withdrawal of military observers from Serb-controlled territory to reduce their vulnerability;
- the use of force to counter violations of resolutions passed by the UN, including the willingness to use close air support to protect peacekeeping forces.

In the longer term, it will also be of primary importance for the international community to indicate clearly that UNPROFOR will not be able to carry out its mandate unless all parties observe a set of conditions whose basic elements were originally proposed by the UN and the Contact Group in July 1994. By way of indication, I will mention only a few of these positive and negative conditions designed to modify the behaviour of the belligerents.

- The international community should require Bosnian Serbs to observe exclusion zones and to reopen humanitarian assistance supply routes.