

between these two groups, the Totalitarian and the Democratic groups; between their policies and tactics and above all, their ideals. There is also a difference between their degrees of solidarity. The Slav group always -- or practically always, except when one member is dozing and doesn't get the signal -- votes as a unit. They really are a block. The Western democratic group, composed of free states, underlines and may occasionally risk that freedom by the very frequent division of its voting strength. Voting chips often fall off that block. It may be, of course, that one group votes always as a unit because it is always right, but this explanation is, to say the least, unconvincing. It may also be that other states vary their support for each other because they are confused or, on the other hand, because the need for voting solidarity is not so great. This also is an inadequate explanation. The fact is that certain states -- democratic states in the progressive and not the reactionary sense of the word -- try to vote as they think right on any given issue, a process which is not always as easy as it should be; made even less easy by the fact that our divisions are gleefully exploited by those who vote to order.

In the face of misrepresentation of motive and distortion of result it becomes tempting not merely to vote with your friends, but to vote against those who will not be your friends. Any other course, you fear, may leave you open to the charge of weakness, of giving aid and comfort to the opposition. This, no doubt, works both ways, with a depressing and dividing result. As the former Secretary of State, James Byrnes, once said:

"I sometimes think our Soviet friends fear we would think them weak and soft if they agreed without a struggle on anything we wanted, even though they wanted it too".

One result of this suspicion between the two strongest powers is a growing tendency to appoint to United Nations political Commissions of investigation and enquiry, middle and small powers only. This is, in a sense, a measure of the deterioration that has developed in relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., because it is, I suppose, a confession that, in political agencies set up by the United Nations, the chances of common agreement are decreased by the membership on them of those two powers. Additional responsibility is, therefore, thrown on smaller states. This creates a situation of some difficulty and, at times, embarrassment, especially for countries like Canada. In the case of very small powers, they are protected to some extent by their very smallness from the consequences of the decisions which they take. The great powers, of course, have always their own protection through the veto, but a middle power, like Canada, can, as two wars and many conferences have shown, make an important contribution to the achievement of victory in war or of a diplomatic decision in peace. This makes its support for policies advanced by others of real value. We in Canada are beginning to realize that our new position of middle power, which we have been rather inclined to boast about, is not without its disadvantages. Being in the middle is not always a comfortable place.

Smaller powers, should not be asked to undertake United Nations duties which their more powerful associates find to be irksome, dangerous or embarrassing. They should not be asked to play roles in the international drama which should be performed by the stars. There are times when, if it is impossible for the stars to act together, a particular play should not be staged at all.

Furthermore, the United Nations, while giving smaller powers more jobs to do, is not giving them the power to do them. There have been several examples of this in recent United Nations history, and they all point to the necessity of taking collective responsibility for, and putting collective force behind, decisions which have been taken collectively. A good illustration of this essential need is the action