
since September 11. In a speech to the graduating class of Westpoint President Bush announced the emergence of a U.S. doctrine of preemptive attacks against terrorists and hostile states possessing chemical, biological or nuclear weapons and deemed to be a threat to the United States. Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, June 1, 2002. *Washington Post*, June 10, 2002, p. A01.

²³ While it is responsible to point out the shortcomings of an agreement that contains no provisions for the weapons that will be retired, it is equally evident that the Bush administration's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has thus far not provoked from Moscow the response Bush's critics predicted. Since much of the negative reaction of West European governments to NMD was influenced by the fear of Russian reaction, it is now reasonable to assume that their objections will diminish in proportion to Russian acquiescence Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, "Nuclear Treaty is all Style, No Substance," *NRC Handelsblad*, May 21, 2002.

²⁴ David Goldfisher, *The Best Defense: Policy Alternatives for U.S. Nuclear Security from the 1950s to the 1990s*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) p.271. See also Roger Handberg, *Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of American Security*, (Westport: Praeger, 2002).

²⁵ Dana Milbank, "Bush, Putin Sign Nuclear Arms Treaty," *Washington Post*, May 24, 2002, A1.

²⁶ *New York Times*, February 22, 2001, p.1; *Washington Post*, December 13, 2001, p.A1; *Wall Street Journal*, May 13, 2002, p.1; Hannes Adomeit, "Putin und die Raketenabwehr: Moscows Haltung zu NMD in Kontext der russisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen," *SWP-Studien*, September, 2001.

²⁷ Keith B. Payne, "Post-Cold War Deterrence and Missile Defense."

²⁸ "Bronze medal technology" will suffice to obtain an arsenal that can intimidate a neighboring state or deter an international intervention force with the threat of WMD attack. The case of Iraq alone has demonstrated that three operative assumptions of supply-side anti-proliferation regimes such as the MCTR are problematic. First, crude ballistic missile technologies are *not* controlled internationally and are perhaps not controllable. Second, developing states with only a modest military-industrial capacity can now develop ballistic missiles with WMD payloads indigenously. Last, the cost of circumventing the MCTR is *not* enough to thwart all countries from making the effort. Peter D. Zimmerman, "Proliferation: Bronze Medal Technology is Enough," *Orbis*, Vol.38, No.1, 1994, pp.67-83.

²⁹ Aluf Benn, "Slowing the Missile Race," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol.58, No.1, 2002, pp.21-23.

³⁰ All of factors in favor of missile defence are cited by Keith Payne in "Post-Cold War Deterrence."

³¹ Michael O'Hanlon, "Cruise Control: A Case for Missile Defense," *The National Interest*, No.67, Spring, 2002, p.93

³² Theodore Postol, "Why Missile Defense Won't Work," *Technology Review*, Vol.105, No.3, 2002, pp.42-52.

³³ Satellites orbit at an altitude of 40,000 kilometers and can be stationed over the same point on the earth's surface, so that once two or more satellites detect a missile's launch they can track its flight in three-dimensional stereo viewing --- until the missile's rocket boosters shut down at 200-300 kilometers altitude. Because such a boost-phase system would use fast, short-range interceptors positioned only a few hundred kilometers from their launch site, it could be devastating against geographically small emerging missile states and rogue nations, but it would be inappropriate for defence against countries such as China and Russia. *Ibid*.

³⁴ Richard D. Sokolsky, "European Missile Defense --- Issues and Options," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn/Winter 2001-02, pp.46-51.