

Russians do not indicate that they have given much thought to the organization of disposition. When the question is raised, they tend to anticipate an arrangement that's brought into being by international agreement, provides funding for work to be done in Russia, and otherwise leaves implementation to Minatom. Those who've read the Agreement will add that Russia's jurisdiction over environmental and safety matters is explicitly recognized by the United States in Article VIII. In short, Russians are likely to expect and to seek maximal control over all disposition activity occurring within their country. They will not be receptive to proposals which entail intergovernmental intervention in their internal affairs. Nor should they. But, as indicated already, nor should the donors turn things over to Minatom.

How then to persuade the Russian Federation to accept international agency for change in their internal safety and environmental practices, agency required by foreign donors who are determined to act responsibly and with an eye to the long-term sustainability of disposition? The answer is first to redefine the problem. Second, it is to make the solution more appealing.

The achievement of sustained disposition in Russian conditions is best regarded as something more than an international security problem in which states have prime responsibility. As well, it can be seen as a problem of enculturation in which Russia instructs its partners as well as learns from them.

The solution to the problem of disposition understood in terms of enculturation is to be found not so much in intergovernmental activity and state-managed programmes within Russia. The lead goes instead to the best in the global industry acting in the public interest. Specifically, the solution is to be had in multinational commercial management activity which brings about targetted change in Russia's political and business practice. This change, in turn, triggers transfers of control over disposition to the Russian Federation. Use of the term multinational, as distinct from international, indicates that from the outset Russia is a central part of the entity and member of the club, not set aside or standing apart.

If the preceding propositions are accepted, the delivery of disposition should be multinational and commercial. It should serve the public purpose. It should be done by a multinational corporation with an intergovernmental board of directors. An entity something like this has been examined by James Lacy and colleagues at the U.S. Department of Energy (Lacy et al., 2000). Their treatment is an early version among others, but it provides a point of departure for our discussion here. Let's see where it might take us.

A key premise is that governments and officials are not the best source of the judgment and know-how required to manage a complex and extended programme of international support for WGPu disposition in the Russian Federation. A new intergovernmental organization, or one that's added onto an existing IO, wouldn't do proper justice to the design, licensing, contracting, construction, financial, and other requirements. Nor on the other hand would a purely commercial entity contracted to provide disposition management services under a Multilateral Agreement: the work of disposition must also mesh with the nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and other shared purposes of the participating governments including, it might be added, nuclear safety and environmental protection. What's suggested as a better course in the Lacy paper therefore is an international nonprofit corporation, which would act as executive agent for the Multilateral Agreement.