

By his own admission, the Force Commander General Dallaire was given absolutely no indication when he took command that he was facing anything other than a traditional peacekeeping function. He was not briefed that events could take a turn for the worse, nor was he brought up to speed on the lengthy and ongoing political history of gross violations of human rights as determined by various UN mechanisms and a number of very credible NGOs. He could be excused for a sense of betrayal in that he was not sufficiently trained and briefed for his mission, and that he was effectively abandoned by almost everyone when the going got tough. These gaps in training and briefings for peacekeepers have become more obvious in past years, but they had not been heeded in time to rectify the induction procedures for General Dallaire. This needs to be worked on by the UN and interested countries with some haste.

RECOMMENDATION

The Canadian Armed Forces should lead by example in carrying out more extensive training for all its members on peacekeeping in general, and the cultural and political contexts of peacekeeping specifically. In addition, its standby troops and individuals designated to take on individual roles such as Force Commander, should receive additional intensive training that is more specific to the country and society that they will be operating in. The issues of conflict resolution, humanitarianism and human rights must be integral to this training.

UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DPKO USG Kofi Annan in his press release of July 28th stated that "the Secretariat is not blameless since our administrative procedures are not entirely suited to the exigencies of an emergency situation; we are taking measures²⁴ to introduce such changes as are possible within the authority of the Secretariat". This self criticism was the only criticism heard about the efforts and professionalism of DPKO over Rwanda or any other peacekeeping operation of recent vintage.

One must clarify here that DPKO has to work with the mandates provided for it by the SC, and it is within these parameters that one must judge DPKO. In other words, the failure of the SC to provide UNAMIR with sufficient resources and mandate to do a credible job has little to do with DPKO. Similarly, the unwillingness of countries to contribute troops and appropriate equipment even once the SC mandated UNAMIR II has little to do with DPKO. In fact, the lethargic and piecemeal way in which countries responded to the request for troops and equipment, impose further and almost impossible burdens on DPKO. Not only did it require a multiplicity of 'begging' calls from DPKO to potential contributors, they then had to attempt to match up a variety of offers of troops without even basic equipment, with equipment offers that were often

²⁴ See the discussion in the Chapter on Coordination and Transition for the broader internal reforms within the UN Secretariat to coordinate DPKO with DHA and DPA.